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Chapter 1 
The Paradox of Redundancy 
1.1 Introduction 
It seems a perfectly valid rule of conversation not t o  tell people what they already know. 
Indeed, Grice's Q U A N T I T Y  maxim: Do not make your contribution more informative than 
is required has often been interpreted this way (Grice, 1967). Stalnaker, as well, suggests 
that  to assert something that is already presupposed is to attempt to do something that is 
already done(Stalnaker, 1978). Thus, the notion of what is informative is judged against a 
background of what is presupposed, i.e., propositions that  all conversants assume are mutually 
believed(Lewis, 1969; Schiffer, 1972). 
Various formulations of this 'no redundancy' rule are a tenet of many theories of dialogue, from 
linguistic(Gazdar, 1979), philosophical(Stalnaker, 1978) and computational perspectives(Cohen, 
1978; Allen, 1979). Ifowever consider the following excerpt from the middle of an advisory di- 
alogue between Harry (h), a talk show host, and Dave (d),  his caller: 
(1) (18) h. I see. Are there any other children beside your wife? 
(19) d. No 
(20) h.  Your wife is an only child 
(21) d. Right. And uh wants to  give her some security ........ 
In example 1, the proposition expressed by (20) should already be mutually believed since 
Harry's assertion simply paraphrases what was said in (18) and (19). It seems unlikely that 
the truth of (20) is in question, for instead of (19), Dave could not say No, but she's not 
an  only child. In addition, (20) is produced with a falling intonational contour typical of 
declarative statements, rather than a rising one often used t o  indicate lack of hearing or 
surprise(Cruttenden, 1986). 
Similarly, it would seem that  the proposition The income from the certificate of deposit rules 
her out as a dependent should be mutually believed after utterance (7) in the excerpt of a call 
from Ray (r)  below: 
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(2) ( 6) r. uh 2 tax questions. one: since April of 81 we have had an 85 year old mother 
living with us. Her only income has been social security plus uh approximately three 
thousand dollars from a certificate of deposit and I wonder what's the situation in 
terms of claiming her as a dependent, or does that  income from the certificate of 
deposit rule her out as a dependent? 
( 7) h. Yes it does 
( 8) r. I t  does 
( 9) h. Yup that  knocks her out ......... 
So why does Ray in (8)' repeat Harry's assertion of it does, and why does Harry paraphrase 
himself and Ray in (9)? The restatements in 1-(20), and in 2-(8) and (9) above, seem prima 
facie incompatible with efficiency in dialogue and in action in general. 
According t o  common information theoretic accounts, these utterances are I N  F O R ~ I A T I O N A L L Y  
R E D U N D A N T .  I will argue however that  they are not communicatively redundant. The defini- 
tion used to  classify them as informationally redundant follows(Hirschberg, 1985)~: 
An utterance u; is INFORMATIONALLY R E D U N D A N T  in a discourse situation S 
1. if ui has already been said in S 
2. if u; expresses a proposition pi, and another utterance uj that  entails pi has 
already been said in S 
This definition and the class of data that  it covers will be discussed and refined in chapter 
2. Here I wish to  characterize my approach to  determining the function of informationally 
redundant utterances (henceforth IRUs). 
My main interest in the paradox of IRUs is what it shows about the incremental process of two 
agents constructing the mutual beliefs and intentions that  are necessary in order to agree on 
a plan for future action. IRUs are a useful data set with which t o  examine the communicative 
process of achieving these mutual beliefs: this is because in the normal case, an utterance adds 
new information to  the context, and so the other communicative functions of the utterance 
seem t o  be secondary. However with IRUs no information is added. This means that  the other 
functions that  these utterances achieve in dialogue are more apparent. 
1.2 Dialogue Type, Autonomy and the Planning Problem 
This section chara,cterizes the type of dialogues that  the analysis is based on and the goals 
that agents engaged in these dialogues are trying to  achieve. I also discuss properties of these 
agents that  contribute to  their success or lack of success in achieving these goals, as well as 
the methods by which they go about constructing plans t o  achieve their goals. 
'Utterance (8) is also said with a falling intonation contour typical of a declarative statement. 
2 ~ e e  also Hobbs' definition of elaboration(Hobbs, 1979). 
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The initial analysis is based on a corpus of naturally occurring advisory dialogues from a talk 
show for financial advice, Speaking of Your Moneg .  I will refer to  this as the HG (Harry 
Gross) corpus. IRUs do occur in single speaker discourse, and their function may be much the 
same as those that will be claimed here. Ilowever there are two reasons to focus on dialogue: 
(1) IRUs seem to be much more prevalent in dialogues, and (2) IRUs seem to  be more prevalent 
in problem solving situations. 
In the talk show setting, I assume the agents have a mutual goal. The mutual goal is to find a 
satisfactory plan for future action that addresses the problem or query presented by the ~ a l l e r . ~  
This goal is normally stated explicitly in the first full turn of the caller. Furthermore, the total 
set of goals in the corpus are restricted: they always contribute to  one of a small number of 
higher level goals. The assumed general goal is to  maximize assets such as income, and the 
caller's opening statement limits the way in which s/he is currently considering achieving this 
goal, such as by maximizing return on investments or by minimizing taxes. 
This means that the planning situation is similar to the one characterized in Pollack's treatment 
of plan inference, namely P L A N  E V A L U A T I O N ( P O ~ ~ ~ C ~ ,  1986; Pollack, 1991). Pollack focused on 
the inference of domain plans, in situations where the goal has been made explicit. The 
reasoning in the situations she discusses involves the evaluation of a domain plan, when it is 
not assumed that agents have identical beliefs about the domain. This contrasts with other 
work on plan inference in which the goal of the inference process is to  determine the domain 
plan of the acting agent(I<autz, 1990). 
However, in the plan evaluation case, even though there is no need to infer the domain goal, 
agents must reason from another conversant's utterances, to  beliefs about their mental state. 
In an extended plan evaluation dialogue, utterance level intentions must be inferred, as well as 
the role that these utterances play in achieving the mutual goal(Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Litman 
and Allen, 1990). 
Agents must achieve mutual belief that they have constructed a plan to a.ddress the mutual goal. 
According to the beliefs model proposed in chapter 3, mutual beliefs are publicly constructed 
by two agents engaged in dialogue, but based on a number of underlying assumptions more or 
less endorsed. This defines a weak model of mutual beliefs; mutual beliefs may be as weak as a 
mutually salient and public supposition. In the joint problem solving task examined here, what 
must be achieved is that there is mutual belief as to  whether an utterance and its propositional 
content have been: 
Understood as the speaker intended 
Accepted or Rejected 
Incorporated into the evolving plan to  address the mutual goal 
None of these mutual beliefs can be automatically assumed. They must be achieved by agents 
who are both resource-bounded and autonomous, with their own prior beliefs, preferences and 
goals. 
3 ~ h i s  talk show is on WCAU in Philadelphia. The corpus was taped from a radio broadcast and originally 
transcribed by Pollack and Hirschberg(Pol1ack et al., 1982; Walker and Whittaker, 1990). 
4The agents may have additional goals as well such as being entertaining, being clever, flirting, etc. 
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Agents' limitations and the fact that  they do not share all the same domain beliefs mean that  
understanding the utterance and determining how its content plays a role in the evolving plan 
cannot be assumed. Agents' autonomy means that  the acceptance of beliefs and candidate 
plans also cannot be assumed. Acceptance is distinct from just understanding what has been 
conveyed, as I explain further in chapter 4.5 Autonomous agents must decide whether they 
will accept as a belief some fact that  they are told and whether they wish to  accept as a goal 
something that  is suggested to  them. Agents may make these decisions by reasoning about 
different ways to  achieve the mutual goal. And since the goal is mutual, agents also must 
resolve conflicts in beliefs and intentions(Galliers, 1989). 
In sum, the achievement of these mutual beliefs is not guaranteed. This is in contrast t o  
certain accounts of speech act interpretation(Litman and Allen, 1990; Cohen and Levesque, 
1991) where acceptance follows directly from the speaker's utterance. I will use the term 
COLLABORATIVE P L A N  or 'plan to  achieve the mutual goal' t o  describe the constellation of 
mutual beliefs and intentions that  agents who are engaged in a joint problem solving task 
must achieve(Whittaker and Stenton, 1988; Walker and Whittaker, 1 9 9 0 ) . ~  
Rosenschein has shown that  planning between two agents is guaranteed t o  converge on a 
collaborative plan only when the information shared between the agents increases monoton- 
ically(Rosenschein, 1985). In the nonmonotonic case, even when there are no inter-agent 
conflicts, it isn't possible generally to  guarantee that the agents will agree on a plan. However 
there is one discourse situation where plan convergence can be guaranteed in the nonmono- 
tonic case. This is when one agent's knowledge is a superset of the other agent's knowledge, 
as in Grosz's pump assembly task or the task in the trains domain(Gros2, 1977; Traum, 1991). 
Yet this situation is not the typical one for most problem solving dialogues in real life(Kidd, 
1985; Whittaker and Stenton, 1988; Walker and Whittaker, 1990). 
The dialogue situation examined here is an instance of the nonmonotonic case; agents in 
dialogue reason as t o  whether to  accept new incoming information or reject i t ,  and whether, 
as a result, to  disbelieve something they previously believed (Galliers, 1991a). Yet despite this 
nonmonotonicity, much of the time the conversants do manage t o  agree on a plan t o  achieve 
the mutual goal. The question is how they do it and what IRUs show about this process. 
This section has introduced the paradox of informatioizally redundant utterances (IRUs) and 
described the perspective from which I will address this paradox. I emphasize that  these ut- 
terances are not communicatively redundant, even though they are informationally redundant. 
Section 1.3 will describe my hypotheses about the roles that  IRUs play in dialogue. These 
hypotheses assume that agents have certain cognitive properties. Section 1.3 examines these 
cognitive properties, the way that  the hypotheses follow from them, and the way that  I intend 
- - 
5However, understanding may be a prerequisite for acceptance, and in certain tasks, such as achieving 
reference(C1ark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), there is no need for such a distinction. This is probably why some 
researchers use the term acceptance for the achievement of understanding(C1ark and Schaefer, 1989; Brennan, 
1990). 
'This term has much in common with Power's characterization of mutual intention, with Grosz and Sidner's 
notion of a SharedPlan, and with Cohen and Levesque's concept of Joint Intention(Power, 1979; Power, 1984; 
Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Cohen and Levesque, 1991). For the time being, it will be simpler if I use my own 
terms. The  approach that  I outline here extends, rather than conflicts, with these other approaches. Section 
8.6 will discuss these accounts further. 
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to support the hypotheses 
1.3 Hypotheses: the initial justification 
IRUs leave us with a paradox given the fact that  agents do not generally perform actions that 
have no purpose. Assuming that  IRUs actually must have a function in discourse, the question 
is what communicative functions do IRUs achieve? 
This section describes hypotheses about three communicative functions that  agents can achieve 
through IRUs. These functions demonstrate that  the conceptualization of dialogue as a simple 
process of information exchange is too limited. I will discuss some cognitive properties of 
human agents and argue that  my hypotheses are motivated by these properties. I will also 
discuss how I will attempt to  validate these hypotheses. 
I propose that  IRUs have three general functions: 
Attitude: to  augment the evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understa,nding and 
acceptance 
Consequence: to  augment the evidence supporting mutual beliefs that  certain inferences 
are licensed, or to  provide a context in which an inference is more easily made 
Attention: t o  manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by making 
or keeping a proposition salient 
Individual IRUs may simultaneously address one or more of these functions. For instance, 
every utterance, redundant or not, will claim the locus of attention a t  the point when it is 
said. Specific examples of these three functions will be discussed later. Here I wish to  consider 
why it is that  agents might want to  achieve them. 
These hypotheses partly follow from some well attested demonstrations about the limitations 
of agent's processing capabilities. When we consider how agents are resource-bounded, it is 
clear that  human agents have limited processing capacity(Kahneman et al., 1982). They must 
often respond in dialogue in a timely manner, and yet they need time to  search memory, 
make inferences and decide what t o  say. They also have limited attentional capacity(Miller, 
1956; Anderson and Bower, 1973). Therefore an agent can't always keep all the relevant facts 
in mind, and also can't make all the inferences that  follow from these facts. 
Agent's resource-bounds show up in the way they behave. Since dialogue is an instance of action 
in general, there should be phenomena in dialogue that  are a result of the fact that  agents are 
resource-bounded. First, agents must manage their own resources so that  dialogue proceeds 
smoothly. Second, in extended plan evaluation dialogues, agents may have to  reason about 
other agents' limitations. Because agents depend on other agents to  realize the mutual goal, 
the limitations of one agent call affect the other. This means that  in her own self-interest, an 
agent may actually model the resource limitations of another and act on this model, in order 
to decrease the amount of processing the other agent must do and thereby ensure that  the 
conversation goes smoothly(C1ark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). 
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My hypothesis is that IRUs are a surface manifestation of agents' management of their resource 
limitations. 
The need to  achieve goals related to Attitude follows from the fact that agents are autonomous 
with their own preferences, beliefs, and goals. Therefore an agent will not necessarily believe 
what she is told or adopt a goal that is suggested to her. Furthermore, in contrast to agent's 
physical activities, which are observable, the mental objects of other agent's beliefs, preferences 
and intentions are non-transparent. Therefore agents look for and give public evidence of the 
effects of utterance actions on their beliefs and intentions. Chapter 4 will discuss Attitude in 
more detail. 
The need to  achieve goals related to  Consequence follows from the fact that agents are not 
logically omniscient. They might not have time to  make all the relevant inferences and might 
not know all the relevant inference rules(Konolige, 1985). In addition, there are always poten- 
tially more inferences that can be made at a particular point in a dialogue. Thus agents may 
make relevant inferences explicit. This can indicate to other agents that a certain inference 
was made, as well as ensuring that another agent made a desired inference. Chapter 5 will 
discuss Consequence in more detail. 
Since human agents have limited attention, the need to manipulate Attention also follows from 
agents' resource-bounds(Grosz, 1977; Sidner, 1979; Clark and Clark, 1977). Agents need to 
coordinate in dialogue and one aspect of this coordination is tracking and manipulating the 
locus of attention of other agents. At times, utterances that are informationally redundant 
serve to  set the context of the discourse and ensure that the agents involved are jointly attending 
to the same concepts(Whittaker and Stenton, 1988; Walker and Whittaker, 1990). Chapter 6 
will discuss Attention in more detail. 
Although I have separated my hypotheses into separate Consequence and Attention functions, 
there is an intimate relationship between processing time and attention; items currently at- 
tended to  can be accessed with constant or zero time(Anderson, 1974; Garrod and Trabasso, 
1973), whereas search is required for other items. If inferences are focused on what is currently 
attended to, as seems likely(Kahneman et al., 19821, then limits on inferencing follow directly 
from limits on attention. To avoid the problem of search for items not attended to, agents 
may manipulate the context to  direct inferences to  be about a particular topic. The data also 
support the view that certain inferences seem to depend on two or more facts being attended 
to  at the same tinie(see section 5.1). If an agent says something to  make sure that a fact is 
currently attended to, because a desired inference is dependent on that fact, that utterance 
functions on both the Attention and the Consequence dimensions. 
I will not discuss these hypotheses further until Chapter 4. The important point to keep 
in mind is that goals to  achieve these functions follow from agents' autonomy and resource 
limitations. This viewpoint will come up repeatedly in what follows. In order to provide 
evidence for these hypotheses I will discuss distributional properties of the data in chapter 
7. However for various reasons discussed there, the distributional analysis only provides weak 
support for the hypotheses. Chapter 8 describes the design of a computational experiment 
that is intended to  provide further support. 
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1.4 Overview of the proposal 
Section 1.1 has introduced the paradox of informationally redundant utterances (IRUs) and 
described the perspective from which I will address this paradox. Section 1.3 described my 
hypotheses about the roles that IRUs play in dialogue and the associated cognitive properties. 
Because the idea that agents actually produce IRUs seems to  go against many previous accounts 
of how language works, it is important to  define very carefully what counts as an IRU. Therefore 
I devote chapter 2 to  a precise definition of an IRU. This definition is based on different logical 
properties of propositions in the discourse situation. Section 2.2.2 discusses specific examples 
that instantiate the definition given in section 2.1. These examples are organized by the logical 
properties of IRUs rather than by the hypothesized communicative functions. The purpose 
of this section is to familiarize the reader with the range of the phenomena. Section 2.2 also 
introduces a number of distributional parameters that are used to  classify the examples; these 
parameters are used in chapter 7, which discusses an initial distributional analysis of the data 
in the corpus. 
Chapter 3 proposes a model of mutual beliefs for dialogue that is both motivated by and 
motivates the data. There are three core distinctions about the status of a belief that are 
supported by this model: (1) whether or not the belief is salient, (2) what type of evidence 
endorses the belief, (3 )  whether or not this endorsement has been made public in the dialogue. 
Once the phenomena of redundancy and tlze model of mutual beliefs have been described, the 
following chapters return to  the discussion of the hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 elaborates on the Attitude hypothesis given in section 1.3. This chapter proposes 
an inferential account of how understanding and acceptance are achieved that is based on 
the model of mutual beliefs presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 makes the distinction between 
understanding and acceptance and discusses cases of IRUs that support the inference of mutual 
beliefs about understanding and acceptance. A niodel of this inference process is proposed and 
the class of examples explained by this model is demonstrated. 
Chapter 5 on Consequence and chapter 6 on Attention give motivating examples of IRUs that 
are hypothesized to demonstrate these functions. The Consequence function depends partly 
on an account of a resource-bounded agent based on the IRMA architecture(Bratman et al., 
1988; Pollack and Ringuette, 1990). The Attention function will be developed along the lines 
of Grosz and Sidner's work on attentional state, and the concept of a focus space(Grosz, 
1977; Sidner, 1979; Grosz and Sidner, 1985). 
Chapters 7 and 8 discusses what will be done to  validate the hypotheses that have been 
proposed. Chapter 7 describes an initial corpus analysis using the pa.rameters introduced in 
section 2.2.2, and discusses what can be tested with this methodology. Chapter 8 proposes a 
computational simulation of a dialogue between two agents that can provide a testbed for the 
proposed hypotheses. 
C H A P T E R  1. T H E  PARADOX OF REDUNDANCY 
Chapter 2 
Informational Redundancy: 
Definition and Description 
This chapter discusses in more detail what utterances in a dialogue count as IRUs. The main 
purpose of this definition is t o  delimit a data set that  this thesis will focus on. 
Typically in language, speakers are more or less explicit about what exactly they take the 
current context to be and what exactly they mean. Levels of explicitness range from utterances 
consisting of all new information to  utterances that  consist of all old information. On this 
continuum, I focus on clauses that  did stand alone, or could stand alone, as utterances. Some 
of these clauses are part of a fuller turn. 
In addition, I only focus on the informational component of an utterance, the propositional 
content. Utterances consist of a string that  is said, the proposition that  is realized by that 
string in a particular context, and an associated utterance level intention, which consists of the 
role of that  utterance in the overall structure of the discourse and the conversants' intentions. 
The notion of IRU is only mean to  refer to  the propositional content of an utterance. These 
utterances are not communicatively redundant, and an IRU does not necessarily realize the 
same utterance level intention as the utterance that  originally added the propositional content 
of the IRU t o  the discourse situation. 
2.1 Definition of Redundancy 
This section provides a definition of redundancy that  will be used throughout the remainder 
of the proposal. Section 2.2.1 provides some of the intonational parameters that  will be used 
to  describe the data given in the following sections. 
The definition of informationaJ redundancy is based on different logical properties of propo- 
sitions in the discourse situation. This definition of informationally redundant depends on a 
"straw man" view of language. I t  is based on a view of communication in which (1) an agent 
merely saying an utterance adds the propositional content of that  utterance to  mutual be- 
liefs, (2) one proposition is communicated a time, and (3) all the inferences deriving from this 
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proposition in combination with alI the previously communicated propositions are automati- 
cally derived(Gazdar, 1979; Barwise, 1988). The discerning reader will note that this account 
contravenes several of the agent limitations and properties described above, My argument 
will be that the function of IRUs can only be derived in a model that recognizes these agent 
properties and limitations. For convenience, I repeat here the definition of redundancy given 
in section 1.1: 
Definition of Redundancy: Version 1 
An utterance u; is INFORMATIONALLY R E D U N D A N T  in a discourse situation S 
1. if u; has already been said in S 
2. if u; expresses a proposition p;, and another utterance u j  that entails pi has 
already been said in S 
An utterance is defined as a cla,use, or a phrase in cases when there is no finite verb in 
an utterance, such as in elliptical noun phrases. Condition (1) of the definition means that 
saying an utterance in a discourse situation adds the propositional content of that utterance 
to the discourse situation. The second condition depends on being able to  identify what is 
entailed from what is said; it relies on concepts such as presupposition, paraphrase, and logical 
inference.' 
It will be useful to have a term to refer to  the utterance(s) that originally added the proposi- 
tional content of the IRU to the discourse situation. Following work on referential discourse 
entities, 1 will call this the IRUs ANTECEDENT. Actually 1 will use the term antecedent to 
refer to  both the prior utterance and the proposition realized by that prior utterance, but this 
should not cause any confusion. In the dialogue excerpts given here, IRUs will be marked with 
CAPS whereas their antecedents will be given in italics. An IRU may be explicitly related to  
its antecedent, e.g. a repetition, or implicitly related to its antecedent, e.g. inferable by modus 
ponens. The types of IRUs examined here are shown in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Types of Informationally Redundant Utterances 
TYPE of IRU 
Entailment 
Presupposition 
Conversational Implicature 
'For the time being I don't include information in the discourse situation that  could be jointly perceived by 
two agents in a shared physical environment, such as Your knee is touching mine. 
EXPLICIT Relation 
to Antecedent(s) 
Repetitions 
Paraphrases 
IMPLICIT Relation 
to  Antecedent(s) 
Modus Ponens Inferences 
Mathematical calculations 
Existential Presuppositions 
Scalar Implicatures 
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Thus there are three basic types of IRUs: entailments, presuppositions and implicatures. I will 
discuss their logical properties and the motivation for including them as IRUs in the remainder 
of this section. 
In the initial corpus analysis, what counts as an entailment is very strictly defined. I assume 
that lexical knowledge is shared if it is not domain specific. Otherwise all the information 
that an entailment depends on must be made public in the dialogue, although I will assume 
knowledge of inference rule schemas such as modus ponens. While it is possible that some 
background knowledge is shared in this dialogue situation and while generally conversants do 
share various kinds of background knowledge, if this knowledge has not been made public in 
the dialogue, for this analysis I do not assume it to  be shared, because it isn't possible to know 
for sure that it is. As mentioned before, the purpose of this definition is to select a set of da.ta 
to  focus on, and it is important for the selection criteria to be replicable. 
Strictly speaking, neither presuppositions nor implicatures are typically counted as entailments 
of utterances since they are not part of the truth conditional meaning of an utterance. Thus 
they do not fit under the definition of redundancy given above. According to the classical 
Gricean view, there are two logical properties that distinguish presuppositions and implicatures 
from ent ailments(Levinson, 1983; Sadock, 1978): 
Reinforceability: whether the inference can be made explicit without redundancy 
Defeasibility: whether the inference can be defeated by additional information or de- 
pending on the discourse situation when the utterance is made 
These properties have ramifications for the beliefs model for dialogue(Sadock, 1978; Grice, 
1975). The way in which the types of IRUs given in Figure 2.1 are classified by these properties 
is shown in Figure 2.2(Bridge7 1991). 
Figure 2.2: Properties of different types of Information Antecedents 
Entailment 
Presupposition 
Conversational Implicature 
In the next section, I will present a number of examples that one would not expect to occur 
given these logical properties, that is counter-examples t o  the classical Gricean view. However 
I will briefly discuss here the basis of this classification. For example, contrast 3a and 3b with 
4a and 4b. 
(3) a. # My sister is older than I am and I am younger than my sister. 
b. # My sister is older than I am but I'm not younger than my sister 
Reinforceability 
no 
order dependent 
Yes 
Defeasibility 
no 
Yes 
Yes 
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Example 3a conjoins two clauses where the second is entailed by the first. Example 3b con- 
joins two clauses where the second one attempts to  defeat the first. Because entailments are 
neither reinforceable nor defeasible, examples 3a and 3b are anomalous. The anomaly occurs 
independent of the order in which these clauses are stated. 
Like entailments, presuppositions are not supposed to  be reinforceable(Gazdar, 1979). Presup- 
positions are similar to implicatures in that they are not part of the truth-conditional rneaning 
of an utterance, but unlike implicatures they are not defeasible. Existential presuppositions 
are often carried by the use of definite expressions. For example, an utterance in which I 
speak of my sister will carry an existential presupposition that I have a sister. Existential 
presuppositions also survive negation. 
(4) a. I have a sister and my sister is older than I am. 
b. # My sister is older than I am and I have a sister. 
c. # My sister is older than I am but I don't have a sister. 
In example 4a, the presupposition is in the clause before the one that presupposes it. Since 
presuppositions can be reinforced as long as the reinforcement comes before the clause that 
introduces the presupposition, 4a is not anomalous. However 4b puts the presupposition after 
the clause that presupposes it and is anomalous. Example 4c shows that presuppositions are 
not defeasible. 
Conversational implicatures, such as the inference from some to  not all are both reinforceable 
without anomalous redundancy as in 5a, as well as defeasible as in 5b: 
(5) a. I ate some of the cookies but I didn't eat all of them. 
b. I ate some of the cookies and in fact I ate all of them. 
Since conversational implicatures are reinforceable it may seem odd to  include as IRUs ut- 
terances that have a conversational implicature as an antecedent. A natural account would 
be that the IRU is just a reinforcement of an implicature. However all the work tha.t I am 
familiar with on the properties of implicatures, such as reinforceability and defeasibility, has 
been based on single utterances such as those in example 5, where the defeater or reinforcer 
is said immediately by the same speaker. Since much of the data examined here provides 
counter-examples to the classical view, I include reinforcements of implicatures when said by 
other speakers, or when non-adjacent to their antecedent, in the class of IRUs examined here. I 
keep the restriction of IRUs non-adjacent to their antecedent to  leave aside the cases that have 
been studied previously as defeating or reinforcing an implicature. Implicatures as antecedents 
will be kept in separate tallies so there should be no confusion. 
There is additionally another class of utterances that seems as though they should be classified 
as informationally redundant. These are PROMPTS such as uh huh. Prompts provide no new 
propositional content to  the dialogue, and thus are a paradox in the same way that IRUs 
are. Howeer prompts don't have an antecedent in the dialogue; no matter what has been 
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said previously, a prompt can add no new information. Because prompts share a number of 
properties with IRUs as to their function in dialogue(Schegloff, 1982; Whittaker and Stenton, 
1988; Walker and Whittaker, 1990), and because they add no new information, I will include 
them as a type of IRU in the remainder of the proposal. 
The previous discussion of presuppositions, implicatures and prompts motivates a revision of 
the definition of redundancy that will be used in the remainder of the proposal. 
Definition of Redundancy: Final Version 
An utterance u; is INFORMATIONALLY R E D U N D A N T  in a discourse situation S 
1. if u; has already been said in S, 
2. if u; expresses a proposition pi, and another utterance uj that entails pi has 
already been said in S, 
3. if u; expresses a proposition p;, and another utterance uj that presupposes 
or implicates p; has already been said in S either non-adjacent to  u; or by 
another speaker, 
4. if u; has no propositional content, ( prompts such as uh huh) 
This is a broad definition of IRUs, but the motivation for collapsing these types together is to 
simplify the discussion of utterances in which the information provided by the utterance could 
reasonably be expected to already be 'available' in the conversation. Each of these categories 
will be tracked separately so that there is no potential for confusion as to the claims being 
made. 
This section defines what counts as an IRU for the purpose of selecting a particular set of data 
that this thesis focuses on. Specific examples will be given in section 2.2.2 and the way in 
which different types of examples relate to  the hypothesized functions discussed in section 1.3 
will be explored in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. However, before discussing the examples, I will 
briefly digress to explain some terms that that will be used to  describe intonational properties 
of the corpus. 
2.2 Descriptive Properties: Intonation and Distribution 
2.2.1 Intonational Properties 
The initial data analysis includes the examination of a number of intonational properties of 
IRUs. I examine the intonation with which an IRU is produced because it is obvious that the 
same string of words can be said in many different ways, and thus communicate many different 
meanings(Liberman and Sag, 1974). I will not use intonation as a defining feature of IRUs, 
relying on the logical properties given in the previous section. However the intonation with 
which an IRU is produced will be relevant when it comes to  discussing whether a particular 
IRU has a particular communicative function. 
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One way that intonation is relevant is in distinguishing between an utterance with a declarative 
syntactic form that is said with a rising 'question' intonation in comparison with the same string 
said with a falling 'declarative' intonation. This distinguishes cases in which the IRU could be 
seen to  function as a clarifying question or to indicate lack of hearing(Cruttenden, 1986). 
The second way that intonation is relevant follows from the classical view that each utterance 
can be divided into old information and new information(Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Clark and 
Haviland, 1977; Prince, 1981b). Old information is already in the discourse situation, what I 
might call redundant information. However the classical view is that each utterance has at least 
one item of new information, the information focus. Since the IRUs examined here provide 
no new information, one aspect of this study is to investigate their potentially anonlalous 
intonational realization, and the ramifications of this for the classical view of information 
structure. 
There are three different terms that I will use to  describe intonational properties of utterances: 
r Boundary tone: this term describes whether the utterance ends with a rising tone, a 
falling tone or a level tone 
r Broad Focus: when an utterance is said with broad focus, no particular element of the 
~ittera~nce is selected for special attention, or the whole utterance is so selected. 
r Narrow Focus: when an item in an utterance receives narrow focus, the utterance is 
normally interpreted as making a predication about that item. In addition, some types 
of narrow focus give rise to  certain inferences. This means that an IRU, said with narrow 
focus, may add inferences to  the discourse situation. 
I will use these terms in the rest of the proposal as part of the description of IRUs. 
2.2.2 Distributional Properties 
The following sections will discuss instances of IRUs from the HG corpus to  illustrate the broad 
range of examples. These examples will be discussed in terms of a number of distributional 
parameters. These parameters are: 
r the logical relation of the IRU to its antecedent. 
r whether the IRU is adjacent to  its antecedent, or the antecedent is remote. 
r whether the antecedent was said by the same or by another speaker. 
r whether the IRU is said with a falling boundary tone as though it were a declarative 
utterance, or a rising boundary tone. 
These are not the only parameters of interest, but they provide a broad classification of the 
data. These parameters will be important in discussing the functions of redundancy in the 
following sections. 
The parameter of the logical relation of the IRU to its antecedent is the basis of the following 
sections' organization. Section 2.3 discusses IRUs that are related to  their antecedent(s) via 
entailment, both explicit entailments such as repetitions in section 2.3.1, and implicit ones such 
as mathematical calculations (sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). Section 2.4 discusses presupposition 
reinforcement, and section 2.5 discusses reinforcement of scalar implicatures. 
2.3 Entailments 
This section describes instances of entailments as IRUs. First I will discuss the entailments 
that bear an explicit relation to  their antecedents, such as repetitions and paraphrases, and 
then those entailments that have an implicit relation to their antecedents such as various types 
of inferences. 
2.3.1 Repetitions 
REPETITIONS are a trivial subset of entailments that match the first condition in the definition 
of redundancy given in section 2.1. Characteristics of repetitions include the stipulation that 
the word order is the same in a repetition as in its antecedent. However, I do assume that 
repetitions include utterances in which a surface mapping has occurred between first and second 
person deictics across spea.kers, e.g. I can be mapped to You.. Consider the repetition in (9) 
below, extracted from a longer dialogue. 
(6) (8) h. you can stop right there: take your money 
( 9 )  j. T A K E  THE MONEY 
(10)h. absolutely ..... 
In example 6, utterance (9) is said with a falling intonation pattern typical of declarative 
utterances. In general, the intonation with which these repetitions are performed seems to  
be a critical part of their meaning. Stylized falls with phrase final Mid tones are common on 
adjacent repetitions and paraphrases(Liberman, 1975; Ladd, 1980; Liberman and McLemore, 
1992). Rises may indicate that the information provided is being questioned in some way. For 
example in 7.12, the repetition is said with a rising 'question' contour.' The information that 
is apparently being 'questioned' in 7.12 has presumably already been provided in 7.11. 
(7) (10) h. How do you feel about stock? 
(11) m. Well, alright, give it a try. 
(12) h. GIVE IT A TRY? 
(13) m. Yes. 
(14) h. How about if we go for twenty five thousand dollars in three different southern 
utilities stocks? 
2The function of rises tha t  I assume here may be specific to this corpus(McLemore, 1991). 
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The previous two examples are cases where a speaker repeats a proposition whose antecedent 
is adjacent to  the repetition, i.e. was said by another conversant in the just prior turn. 
Repetitions across speakers can also occur in cases where the antecedent is r e m o t e  from the 
IRU, as in (43) and (58) below. 
(8) (42) h. Now what is your income situation? 
(43) m. We're both retired and our income for the year is about urn 24.. about 26 
thousand 
(44) h. Have you other securities than stock? Have you any bonds or certificates? 
(45) m. Yes yes we do- we have some certificates oh about uh 15 - 20 thousand not 
much we're not rich - and we have a house completely paid for, have some land in the 
poconos, completely paid for - and uh that's actually the extent of our uh 
(46) h. Ok - on the proceeds of that gm stock 
(47) m. Yes 
(48) h. I'd like to  see you put that into two different southern utilities 
(clarification of southern utilities) 
(58) h. And those I think that you will find that that will give you a good return, 
YOU ARE RETIRED 
and that is primarily what you are looking for addition I think that eventually those 
stocks will rise as well 
(59) m. uh huh 
All the examples seen so far are cases where a speaker repeats an utterance that another 
conversant originally added to the context. In 9, the speaker repeats her own statement, which 
was initially added to  the context by the first clause, and then presupposed by the second 
clause(See also (Horn, 1991; Ward, 1985; Ward, 1990)). This repetition is completed within a 
single speaker's turn. 
( 9 )  I like you Liz. 
I don't know why I like you. But I LIKE YOU. (CS, 3/4/92) 
Adjacent repetitions are frequently elliptical; only a portion of the previous utterance is selected 
for repetition in 10. The repetition of any subconstituent or any part of what was said counts 
as a repetition. 
(10) (24) r. uh no. but how about the twenty eight hundred dollars interest? 
(25) h. the amount of interest you can put into an im3 
( 2 6 )  r. I I CAN and 
(27) h. yes 
3 ~ n  IRA is an Individual Retirement Account, which is a way of putting aside some income and deferring 
paying income taxes on it .  
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Finally, the proposition conveyed by the repetition may be embedded within another proposi- 
tional operator, such as if in example 11. 
(11) (30) h. is he se2f-employed? 
(31) 1. yes 
(32) h. i'm sorry, i missed that 
(33) 1. yes he is. 
(34)  h. if HE'S SELF-EMPLOYED, why not start for him a Keogh plan4? 
you can't get an IRA after 70, but you can get a Keogh plan 
In 11, the utterance of (34) has an embedded proposition, he's self-employed that is already 
both given and salient in the discourse. 
2.3.2 Paraphrases 
With PARAPHRASES, as with repetitions, the relation of the paraphrase to its antecedent may 
be one of a number of types, both logically and sequentially. Some are adjacent to their 
antecedent and some are remote, some occur across speakers whereas sometimes a speaker 
pa,raphrases herself. 
The simplest paraphrases are slightly more complex than a repetition, involving syntactic 
manipulations such as topicalization(Prince, 1981a; McKeown, 1985). These consist of repack- 
aging the same information into a different form. For instance, this type of rule can generate 
(b) from (a): 
(12) a. You cannot claim the dependency. 
b. The dependency you cannot claim. 
These two utterances are different with respect to  their discourse function, but their propo- 
sitional content is the same(Ward, 1985; Prince, 1986; Ward and Prince, 1991; Prince, 1985). 
Another type of paraphrase is inferences based on lexical or phrasal knowledge(Meltuk, 1988). 
For example in 13 below: 
(13) a. There are no other children beside your wife. 
b. Your wife is an only child. 
The inference from (a) to  (b) is based on an axiom that defines only child as equivalent to  
someone with no siblings. This was demonstrated in example 1 in section 1.1. Similarly in 
the first clause in (56) below, the lexical semantics of the verb separate entails a division of 
something into at least two distinct parts. However Harry paraphrases himself in the following 
utterance. 
4~ Keogh plan is another way of putting aside some income and deferring paying income taxes on it. However 
Keogh plans are only available to  self-employed individuals. 
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(14) (56) h. and but separate it. I DON'T WANT IT ALL IN ONE. 
A slightly more complex set of paraphrases involves logical transformations such as the mapping 
between (a) and (b). 
(15) a. All of the money you have spent is indirect. 
b. None of the money you have spent is direct. 
This is demonstrated in the excerpt below in which Harry (h) paraphrases his statement in 
(11) with the utterances in (13) and (15). 
(16) ( 9) h. ... Now there is something you can do. Do you support her in any way? 
(10) r .  yes well i mean she yeah we supply, you know, everything, heat light uh food. 
In other words we, you know, she pays nothing as far as the uh upkeep of the home. 
(11) h. and the only amount that that you have spent then is indirect. 
(12) r .  uhh 
(13) h. THERE'S NOTHING DIRECT 
(14) r. yea 
(15) h. THAT YOU SPEND 
(16) r. food ...... 
2.3.3 Modus Ponens Inferences 
Entailments also include inferences made via classic inference rules, such as M O D U S  P O N E N S  
and M O D U S  TOLLENS.  Condition (2) of the definition of redundancy means that if (a) and (b) 
below are in the discourse situation, then (c) will be an IRU since it is entailed from (a) and 
(b) via MODUS TOLLENS: 
(17) a. You can buy an I R A if and only if you do NOT have an existing pension plan. 
b. You have an existing pension plan. 
c. You cannot buy an I R A. 
The following excerpt demonstrates this structure. Utterance 18.(15) realizes the proposition 
in 17a, utterance 18.(16) realizes the proposition in 17b, and utterance 18.(17) makes the 
inference explicit that is given in 17c for the particular tax year of 1981. 
(18) (15) h. Oh no. I R A's were available as long as you are not a participant in  an 
existing pension 
(16) j. Oh I see. Well I did work, I do work for a company that has a pension 
(17) h. ahh. THEN YOU'RE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE 
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I also assume that  there is an entailment scale for quantifiers and amounts(Horn, 1984). For 
example, 19(a) entails 19(b). So if 19(a) is in the discourse situation, a statement of 19b will 
be an IRU. 
(19) a. I have 10,000 dollars in a certificate of deposit. 
b. I have some money in a certificate of deposit. 
The following excerpt demonstrates making an inference explicit that  follows from this type of 
inference rule. Utterance (28) realizes 19a, and utterance (31) realizes 19b. 
(20) (28) j. I also have ten thousand in a cd5 six month CD 
(29) h. Oh, uh hang on, do you have anything else? 
(30) j. That that 's i t .  that's it. 
(31) h. Well now we're talking about something slightly different. 
YOU ALREADY HAVE SOME MONEY IN A CD. 
Have you anyone dependent on you? 
2.3.4 Mathematical Calculations 
I will also assume that  entailments include some simple mathematical calculations that  would 
lead for instance from (a) and (b) to  (c), assuming some appropriate definition of about. 
(21) a. I am now making 9 thousand 7 hundred dollars. 
b. I used to  make about 17 thousand dollars. 
c. I am now making about half of what I used t o  make. 
This is demonstrated in (4), (13) and (14) below 
(22) ( 4) c. oh sir - i was put off the job, i had a city job, and uh they put me off with 
high blood pressure and hypertension. so i get a a pension retirement of 9 thousand 7 
hundred dollars, that's non-service connected. i have t o  pay income tax on that  don't 
i ? 
( 5) h. fred? 
( 6) c. i have to pay income tax ... 
( 7) h.  yea yes 
(12) f. well uh - how does that amount relate t o  the amount you were receiving when 
you were employed 
5 A  CD is a Certificate of Deposit, where money is put aside for a period of time at a higher rate of interest. 
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(13) c. uh i was making approzimately about 17 thousand 
(14) f. ok - AND YOU'RE NOW GETTING ABOUT 50 % OF THAT FIGURE 
(15) c. uh yes sir ........ 
This concludes the description of IRUs related to their antecedents via entailment. The 
next two sections discuss IRUs that are related to  their antecedents through the non-truth- 
conditional inference types of presupposition and implicature. 
2.4 Presuppositions 
As discussed in section 2.1, like entailments, presuppositions are not supposed to be reinforce- 
able. Presuppositions are similar to  implicatures in that they are not considered to be part 
of the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance; unlike implicatures they are not defeasible. 
The EXISTENTIAL presupposition given in 23(c), is presupposed by both 23(a) and 23(b). 
(23) a. The charges will be excessive. 
b. The charges won't be excessive. 
c. There are charges. 
However consider the following excerpt. 
(24) (22) b. are there ah .. i don't think the ah brokerage charge will be ah that excessive 
(23) h. no They're not excessive but THERE ARE CHARGES 
In 24, it seems that Bill (b) might have been starting out with a question as to  whether there 
are brokerage charges or not. However even if this question were completely expressed, what it 
would add to  the representation of the discourse situation is that Bill doesn't know whether or 
not there are brokerage charges. This is cancelled by the next part of Bill's utterance, which uses 
a definite referring expression the brokerage charge. In (23) Harry (h) further presupposes the 
existence of said brokerage charges, by predicating of them that they are in fact not excessive, 
then affirms their existence. 
Similarly in (13) below the caller (c) asserts that there is a family, predicates of this family 
that they were not close to  him, the caller's former employer, and then affirms again that there 
is a family. 
( 2 5 )  (10) h. let me ask one question of you 
(11) c. Y U P  
(12) h. uh was there a family 
(13) c. yes, well that that is the problem. there is a family. uh it it they ((pause)) 
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weren't close to  him because he was really a loner. hmmm, but THERE IS A FAMILY 
INVOLVED to this matter of fact the umm, well i'll explain what happened. 
It is not clear on first inspection whether these affirmations actually have to do with affirming 
the existence of the referent, whether they are related to  manipulating attentional state, or 
they have to  do with some rhetorical schema(See (Horn, 1991; Ward, 1990)). This will be 
discussed further in chapter 6. 
2.5 Scalar Implicat ures 
I am not going to  explain in detail the analysis of scalar implicature that I assume here(Hirschberg, 
1985)' hoping that a gloss will suffice t o  explain examples 26 and 27. 
In the following excerpt, Doug (d) uses the term girlfriend in 26-9 which implicates, by the 
Quantity Maxim(Grice, 1967), that the woman he is speaking of is not his wife. 
(26) ( 7) d. I'm fine. I've got a general tax question for you. ( 8) h. sure 
( 9) d. uh my girlfriend and I bought a house in december. And uh we're both on the 
mortgage. and we're not sure as to  how to handle the mortgage, or excuse me how to 
handle the deductions. 
Uh every example I see in tax books usually cites a married couple, though and 
WE'RE NOT MARRIED. and we uh I'm afraid that this year she will not qualify for 
uh to itemize. I will - I'll be well over it. 
(10) h. Who made the payments? .... 
However, a few utterances later, he makes this implicature explicit, by actually stating that 
they are not married. In this case the speaker makes his own implicature explicit. However 
in example 27, Maurie (m) in (15) requests Harry to make an implicature explicit that was 
implicated in Harry's utterance in (14). 
(27) (12) h. then they are remiss in not sending it to  you because that money is taxable 
sir 
(13) m. i i know it's taxable, but but i thought they would wait until the end of the 
30 months 
(14) h. no sir, not for state purposes or federal purposes neither way, and remember 
for state purposes, you do not get a deduction for the interest you're paying e m  
(15) m. and for federal? 
(16) h. FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES YOU DO GET A DEDUCTION FOR THE 
INTEREST THAT YOU'RE PAYING 
(17) m. that's the uh that was my question okay 
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This implicature is what is actually conveyed in Harry's utterance at  (16). The inference rule 
for implicature depends on the fact that (14) provides a salient scale, of state purposes, federal 
purposes. This scale is only partially ordered; in fact the two values are incomparable. Since 
(14) makes this scale salient, Harry's denial of for state purposes, you get a deduction for the 
interest that you are paying in (14), licenses a scalar implicature. This implicature is generated 
by the recognition of the denial of a proposition predicated on a member of a salient scale. 
The denial licenses the implicature that either Harry doesn't know whether the proposition 
can be denied for other members of the scale or Harry believes the proposition can't be denied, 
in other words the proposition holds. Therefore, since Harry is in a position to  know, Harry 
has implicated that for federal, you do get a deduction for the interest that you are paying. 
Nevertheless the caller requests that this implicature be made explicit in (15). 
2.6 Summary 
This completes the discussion of the types of examples that are examined in this proposal. 
We have seen that IRUs can have various logical properties, and can be explicitly or implicitly 
related to their antecedents. They can vary in terms of their location, which can be adjacent or 
remote, or in the same speaker's last utterance. An IRU and its antecedent may also be within 
one turn of a speaker. Another conversant may have added the antecedent to the discourse 
situation, or the speaker of the IRU may be reformulating his own contribution. They may 
be explicitly embedded in a propositional operator such as a conditional. An IRU may be 
elliptical or a full clause, and may be said with falling or rising intonation. These properties 
will be discussed again in chapter 7. The next chapter describes a model of mutual beliefs that 
supports the analysis given here. 
Chapter 3 
Belief Model 
In order to explain how the hypotheses will be developed, I must first characterize some 
properties of the model of mutual beliefs. This is because utterances operate on the mental 
state of the discourse participants. In other words, utterances are intended to affect cognitive 
representations. It seems then that an accurate characterization of utterance effects depends 
on an accurate characterization of how beliefs are augmented and revised. 
The beliefs model for dialogue must distinguish the properties of various types of antecedents 
of IRUs that were discussed in section 2.2.2. These properties include whether the antecedent 
was entailed via logical inference, or whether it was implicated and thus defeasible. The model 
should also distinguish between beliefs that are made public and those that are not since what 
has been said is clearly part of the discourse situation. In contrast, what is inferable may 
not be part of the discourse situation due to  agents' limited inferential capabilities. These 
properties have to do with the evidence supporting a belief. 
It is also desirable to  distinguish beliefs that are currently attended to from those that are 
not, in order to  capture the differences between IRUs with salient antecedents and ones whose 
antecedents occurred much earlier in the dialogue. Whether or not a belief is currently attended 
to at a particular point in a dialogue is independent of the evidence supporting a belief. A 
fact may be believed very strongly, and yet not be currently in an agent's consciousness. 
Alternately an agent may be obsessed with a belief for which she has no evidence. I shall 
argue that being 'in consciousness' is a critical determinant of the ease with which inferences 
are made(Kahneman et al., 1982). Section 3.1 will discuss the evidence aspect of the beliefs 
model. Salience will be discussed in section 3.2. 
3.1 Shared Environment Model of Mutual Beliefs 
The beliefs model proposed here is based is Lewis's SHARED E N V I R O N M E N T  model for common 
knowledgeflewis, 1969; Clark and Marshall, 1981). In this model, mutual beliefs depend on 
evidence, openly available to the conversants, plus a number of underlying assumptions. 
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Shared Environment Mutual Belief Induction Schema 
It is mutually believed in a population P that !P if and only if some situation S 
holds such that: 
1. Everyone in P has reason to believe that S holds. 
2. S indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to  believe that S 
holds. 
3. S indicates to  everyone in P that !€fa 
The situation S, used above in the mutual belief induction schema, is the discourse situation. 
Condition (3)  of the induction schema states that the situation must be public, and it must 
publicly indicate which agents of a population P have access to  the situation. Condition 
(3) then specifies that mutual beliefs are indicated by a discourse situation. The discourse 
situation itself is characterized by three distinct notions: PUBLIC EVENTS, ASSUMPTIONS and 
ENDORSEMENTS. 
The discourse situation consists of a sequence of public UTTERANCE EVENTS.  Each public ut- 
terance event changes the discourse situation producing a new discourse situation. According 
to step (3) ,  agents must determine what the discourse situation indicates in order to deter- 
mine what is mutually believed, i.e. 9. In other words, agents must reason about what the 
discourse situation, S ,  indicates, and this depends on interpreting a public event according to 
a set of ASSUMPTIONS.  The fact that the inference of a particular mutual belief relies on a 
particular set of assumptions already must be mutually believed.' Which assumptions underlie 
a particular inference may be partially defined by the previous discourse situation, by conven- 
tions of communication, or by agents' shared background(C1ark and Marshall, 1981; Perner 
and Garnham, 1988; Grice, 1957). The final piece is that each assumption has an associated 
ENDORSEMENT.  This endorsement is meant, roughly, to  indicate how strongly the assumption 
is believed. 
An example of the inference rule schema for the model of mutual belief is given below. A 
Public-Event can be any action that is done openly in a shared environment; I will only 
consider utterance events in this proposal. The symbol -.+ means inferable as a mutual belief 
under certain a ~ s u m ~ t i o n s . ~  The assumptions are given with the rule and the [endorsement] 
annotation indicates the type of the endorsement that each assumption receives. 
Public-Event(?A, ?B, ?U,  ?P)  -.+ Fact(?B, ?P) [endorsement] 
Assumptions = assumption-1 (?A, ?B) [endorsement] 
. . 
assumption-n (?B ?U ?P) [endorsement] 
'Since the inference of mutual beliefs depends on a conversant's own reasoning about what a discourse 
situation indicates, each conversant must have their own model of what is mutually believed. Conversants work 
under the assumption that their models are in fact the same, and the process of conversation demonstrates their 
efforts to keep them the same. 
2 I  do not intend to address the frame problem. 
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Examples using this schema will be given in the next section where I describe the model of how 
agents achieve mutual belief of understanding and acceptance. However, first I must discuss 
the nature of endorsements. 
3.1.1 Endorsements 
Endorsements provide a qualitative way of distinguishing between beliefs that an agent would 
easily give up and those that an agent would rarely change. An endorsement can be very weak, 
meaning that the assumption that has that endorsement is very weak, entailing that a mutual 
belief that depends on that assumption is easily defeasible. The types of endorsements are 
categorized and ordered from weakest to  strongest: HYPOTHESIS < DEFAULT < ENTAILMENT 
< LINGUISTIC <  ABSOLUTE(^^^ (Prince, 1981b; Clark and Marshall, 1981; Galliers, 1991b)). 
This schema defines a model of mutual beliefs that can range from mutual suppositions to  
mutual knowledge(Prince, 1978; Nadathur and Joshi, 1983). 
The ordering on the types of endorsements reflects the relative defeasibility of different as- 
sumptions; an assumption endorsed as a DEFAULT can get defeated by LINGUISTIC information. 
For example, suppose that the mutual belief is Madison can swim. This belief is based on two 
shared assumptions: (1) Madison is a dog, ( 2 )  Dogs can swim. Let's say assumption (1) is 
somethi~lg that two agents can see with their own eyes, so it might be strongly endorsed, e.g. 
ABSOLUTE.  In the absence of other evidence, agents make a default inference about dogs and 
their ability to swirn. Assumption (2) is thus endorsed as a DEFAULT. Since (2) is only a de- 
fault, it can be easily defeated. If Madison's owner comes along and tells the two agents that 
Madison can't swim, they are likely to abandon their mutual belief that Madison can swim, 
i.e. the mutual belief that Madison can swim is defeated. It is also possible to upgrade the 
endorsement of an assumption, and thereby make it less defeasible. For instance, Madison's 
owner might come along and tell the two agents Madison is a very good swimmer. The mutual 
belief that Madison can swim now has an endorsement type of LINGUISTIC. One of the roles of 
IRUs that will be discussed in the next section is this function of upgrading the endorsement 
for a mutual belief. 
Endorsements can provide the distinctions between different types of information that were 
discussed in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. The claim is that some types of endorsements provide 
better support for beliefs than other types. The type HYPOTHESIS is is the weakest possible 
endorsement. It is used to  endorse assumptions that have no evidence supporting them at 
all, and DEFAULT is used for defeasible inferences such as implicatures and what I will call 
conversational defaults in section 4.1. The endorsement ENTAILMENT is used for entailments 
and presuppositions that have not been made explicit. LINGUISTIC endorses assumptions that 
have been made explicit in the dialogue and ABSOLUTE refers to  assumptions that are incon- 
trovertible as though from divine authority. Of course the same assun~ption can have multiple 
endorsements; it may be both entailed by what has been said as well said explicitly, i.e. it has 
endorsements of both types E N T A I L M E N T  and LINGUISTIC. 
A claim of this proposal is that Attitude and Consequence IRUs function to  upgrade the type 
of an endorsement on an assumption underlying a mutual belief. This then makes the mutual 
belief that depends on that assumption less defeasible. 
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As a simple example of this claim, consider the fact that whether an utterance event has any 
effect at all depends on an assumption that the addressee actually heard what was said. Let's 
call this the COMPLETE HEARING assumption(C1ark and Schaefer, 1989). In many cases, ex- 
plicit evidence that would support this assumption is never provided in the discourse situation. 
However an addressee may repeat verbatim what was just said as in 28 below: 
(28) A: The number is 427 899. 
B: 427 899. 
B's repetition means that the complete hearing assumption now has an endorsement type 
of linguistic. This claim will be discussed further in section 4.1. First though, I must briefly 
digress to address the question of how the endorsements on assumptions as given in the schema 
above, combined with the endorsement on the inference rule used to  infer Fact(?B, ?P), affect 
the strength with which Fact(?B, ?P) is believed. 
3.1.2 Combining Endorsements 
In order t o  address the problem of how it is that the endorsements on assumptions are combined 
and reasoned about, for the time being, I adopt a rule that a chain of reasoning is only as 
strong as its weakest link. 
Weakest Link Rule: The endorsement of a belief P depending on a set of under- 
lying assumptions a;, ... a, is MIN(Strength (a;, ... a,))  
This seems intuitively plausible and means that the endorsement of a belief depends on the 
endorsements of the underlying assumptions. It also means that for all inference rules that 
depend on multiple assumptions, the endorsement of an inferred belief is the weakest of the 
supporting beliefs. Since the inference rule itself is one of the supporting beliefs, and it has 
an associated endorsement, this means that some kinds of inferences, such as implicatures, 
cannot be believed as more than defaults no matter how strong the endorsements are on the 
assumptions. 
This account of mutual beliefs has been strongly influenced by Gallier's account of single agent 
beliefs(Galliers, 1991b). According to  Galliers, the strength of a belief depends on both the 
number of supporting assumptions as well as their individual endorsements. The number of 
supporting assumptions gives a measure of the coherence of the whole belief set(Harman, 1986). 
Coherence of a set of beliefs is determined by links of 'explanation' and 'causality'. This view 
is cognitively plausible, yet it raises problems with the determination of the relative weight of 
these two factors. It also means that the granularity of the assumptions underlying a belief 
can affect the calculation of how strongly a belief is endorsed. This aspect of Gallier's system 
is still under development, and I am avoiding these issues through the use of the weakest link 
rule. 
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3.2 Salience of Beliefs 
There are two points I wish to  make about modeling the salience of a belief. The first point is 
that salience is a binary distinction that cuts across all the types of beliefs discussed earlier. 
The salience of a belief is completely independent of the assumptions underlying it and the 
endorsements on these assumptions. Salience is not an endorsement type for beliefs, rather 
any type of belief can be currently salient or not. 
The second point is that there seems to be evidence that the proposition realized by the most 
recent utterance has a special status in terms of salience(Anderson and Bower, 1973; Landauer, 
1975; Clark and Clark, 1977). I will assume the most recent utterance corresponds to the most 
salient proposition. For convenience I will refer to  most recent utterance as the CENTERED 
proposition, following work on referential discourse entities(Grosz et al., 1983; Grosz et al., 
1986). This recency-based definition of salience doesn't account for sentential and discourse 
subordination. Nor does it account for the effect of frequency on discourse salience. Thus this 
definition is a temporary working definition that will be used in the description of examples 
from the corpus discussed in section 7. The attention/memory model will be refined as part of 
the proposed work. This will permit the exploration of specific hypotheses about the effects of 
frequency on salience in the course of performing the dialogue simulation experiments proposed 
in chapter 8. 
In computational terms, therefore, it is relatively simple to  model whether beliefs are salient; 
either they are part of a special subset of beliefs in the current focus space, or they are not. 
The more difficult question is how beliefs get moved into and out of the current focus space. 
This will be discussed in chapters 6 and 8. 
3.3 Types of Propositions 
Propositions can be of many different types: events, acts, processes, states(Webber, 1978). At 
the risk of oversimplifying, I will make a simple distinction between propositions that describe 
states and facts, and those that describe actions or goals. I will call factual propositions 
belief-props, and those that describe actions act-props. 
This distinction is necessary because agents in advisory dialogues discuss beliefs about the 
current state as well as future actions and the effects of these  action^.^ When I discuss accepting 
an utterance in chapter 4, there is a distinction dependent on whether the utterance realizes a 
belief-prop or an act-prop. If the propositional content of an utterance is a fact, acceptance of 
the utterance means believing the propositional content. If the propositional content proposes 
a future action of the agent, then acceptance may generate an intention to act. At the least, 
acceptance will generate the consideration of adopting an intention to act. This distinction 
will be discussed in sections 5.1 and 8.2. 
3I  am focusing on dialogues where the execution of actions is not interleaved with the discussion. All actions 
are t o  be executed in the future. 
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3.4 Summary 
This representation of mutual belief differs from the common representation in terms of an 
iterated conjunction(Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Litman and Allen, 1990) in that: (1) it dis- 
tinguishes between private beliefs and public beliefs; (2 )  it allows one to  represent the different 
kinds of evidence for mutual belief; (3) it controls reasoning when discrepancies in mutual 
beliefs are discovered since the assumptions and their endorsements can be inspected; (4) it 
consists of a finite decision procedure of checking the three conditions in the mutual belief 
induction schema rather than an infinite list of statements. The next chapter will present a 
model of how mutual understanding and acceptance are achieved that depends on this model 
of mutual belief. 
Chapter 4 
Attitude 
I claimed in section 1.2 that agents in a dialogue need t o  achieve communicative functions 
related to  Attitude. They need to  achieve mutual belief in the understanding and acceptance 
of an utterance in order have a collaborative plan involving the proposition realized by that 
utterance. Yet while understanding and acceptance can be communicated directly through 
utterances such as I understand and I agree, such explicitness is very rare. Agents must 
therefore infer whether in fact mutual understanding and acceptance have been achieved. 
The key claim of this chapter is that agents monitor the effects of their utterance actions 
in order to  make these inferences. However, even if an agent monitors for the effect of her 
utterance, she cannot directly perceive the effect of an utterance because she does not have 
direct access t o  another agent's mind. Therefore, she must infer the effect of the utterance by 
observing the other agent's behavior. 
There are two key points about how these inferences are made: (1) there must be some public 
behavior by the addressee that licences the inference, and (2)  this public event must occur 
soon after the original event in order for dialogue t o  operate efficiently. 
I claim that  the way that  mutual understanding and acceptance are achieved is through a two 
part process: (1) A speaker produces an utterance. This public event weakly licenses a mutual 
belief of understanding and acceptance as a HYPOTHESIS,  irrespective of the good intentions 
of the speaker. (2) The next action by the addressee is taken as evidence of the effect of the 
speaker's utterance.' 
This evidence is then reasoned about. Both conversants are cognizant of the fact that  this is 
how conversation works, so an addressee, when planning her utterance, in addition t o  plan- 
ning its content, must also reason about what it will demonstrate about the effect of her 
co-conversant's last utterance. 
This is a local process, i.e. it is the next utterance that  is monitored for the effect of the 
previous. This has been characterized as a convention or as a 'rule of conversation'(Sacks 
et al., 1974). But rather than being merely conventional, it seems that  there are very good 
functional reasons for the convention to  exist. 
'Except for circumstances where it is clear that  the flow of the conversation has been interrupted 
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First, consider psychological studies about the limits on attention/niemory. These stud- 
ies found that the verbatim content of an utterance is retained for a very short period of 
time(Bransford et al., 1972; Anderson, 1974). This means that any action in dialogue that 
has a communicative function related to  the understanding and acceptance of a proposition 
communicated by an utterance, is constrained to  occur very soon after that utterance, or risk 
incurring an additional cost of reinstantiating that utterance as the current locus of attention. 
Furthermore, there is an abundance of other psychological data on debriefing(Kahneman et 
al., 1982), showing that inferences based on facts that are untrue will persist even when the 
original fact has been retracted. This is incorporated in Harman's Principle of Positive Un- 
dermining(Galliers, 1990; Harman, 1986): 
Pr inciple  of Positive Undermining:  
Only stop believing a current belief if there are positive reasons to do so, and this 
does not include an absence of justification for that belief. 
This means that in order to retract all beliefs that were added as an inference from a false 
belief, each inferred belief would independently have to  be explicitly challenged. In combination 
with the fact that belief revision is a costly operation, these observations show that there is 
a strong pressure on conversants to ensure that they have understood and been understood 
in the intended way at t h e  t i m e  the propositional content of the utterance is initially added 
to the representation of mutual beliefs. In other words, there is strong motivation for local 
managemen t  of potential misunderstandings and disagreements and for explicit signals by 
conversants as to  their beliefs about the current propositional content. 
This means that all of the IRUs related to Attitude occur soon after their antecedents. I will 
focus on a special case of this, those cases where the IRU is adjacent t o  its antecedent. The 
way in which communication goals of Attitude are achieved is discussed in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
4.1 Mutual Belief of Understanding 
This section considers the inference of mutual understanding. Note that what is being modelled 
here is mutual belief that the utterance has been understood as intended,  not mutual belief 
in the truth of the propositional content of the utterance. That will be discussed in section 
4.2. 
I adopt the assumption that the participants in a dialogue are trying to  achieve some pur- 
pose(Grosz and Sidner, 1986) and that some aspects of the structure of dialogue arises from 
the structure of these purposes and their relation to  one another. The minimal purpose of 
any purposeful dialogue is that an utterance be understood, and this goal is a prerequisite to  
achieving other goals in dialogue, such as another agent believing the proposition conveyed, or 
committing to a future action described by that proposition. Thus achieving m u t u a l  belief 
of unders tanding  is an instance of the type of activity that agents must perform as they 
collaborate to  achieve the purposes of the dialogue. I expect that the details of the model that 
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are needed to  support the achievement of mutual belief of understanding can be extended to 
the achievement of other goals in dialogue. 
Utterance intentions are not made explicit and the effects of an utterance on the addressee are 
not transparent to  the speaker. This means that achieving understanding is not unproblem- 
atic; it is a process that must be managed, just as other goal achieving processes are(C1ark 
and Schaefer, 1989; Brennan, 1990). While the speaker may have their own private beliefs 
about whether or not the utterance will have the intended effect, this description is meant to  
characterize what is made public by an utterance event. All that is made public is that the 
speaker has a hypothesis that this utterance will achieve some effect. I will argue that it is the 
addressee's actions that offer evidence to the speaker about the effects of the utterance. 
According to  the shared environment model, an utterance event in a discourse situation licenses 
the inference of mutual underst anding, under certain a s ~ u m ~ t i o n s . ~  Mutual belief that the 
addressee B understood U to mean P, is based on assumptions such as: (1) the addressee 
B is attending to the utterance (the ATTENTION assumption); (2) the addressee hears U (the 
C O M P L E T E  H E A R I N G  assumption); and (3) the addressee believes that U realizes the proposition 
P that the speaker intended to  convey (the REALIZATION a s ~ u m ~ t i o n ) . ~  This is depicted in 
the inference rule schema given below. In this schema, the term say(A, B, U,  P )  describes a 
public utterance event in which an agent A says an utterance U to another agent B meaning 
to convey a proposition P . ~  The assumptions described above are given with the rule. 
say (?A, ?B, ?U, ?P)  - understand(?B, ?P)  [absolute] 
Assumptions = attend (?B, ?U) [hypothesis] 
hear (?B, ?U) [hypothesis] 
believe (?B, realizes(?U, ?P) )  [hypothesis] 
An utterance demonstrates a public hypothesis that it will achieve its purpose. This public 
event licenses the inference of mutual belief according to the mutual belief induction schema. 
Each of the assumptions underlying the mutual belief starts out with an endorsement of HY- 
POTHESIS. It isn't until after the addressee's next action that an assumption may have its 
endorsement modified. Since assumptions are very defeasible when they are only hypotheses, 
this representation allows further events in the situation to  cancel the inference of mutual un- 
derstanding. For example the addressee may say What? which defeats the COMPLETE H E A R I N G  
assumption. However, further events in the discourse may also upgrade the endorsements on 
the assumptions underlying the inference of mutual understanding. For instance, the way some 
IRUs function to achieve mutual belief of understanding is by addressing the assumptions un- 
derlying the inference of mutual understanding. For instance, a repetition directly addresses 
the complete H E A R I N G  assumption. 
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 give examples of repetitions and paraphrases from the IIG corpus. 
'Of course a single utterance event may license the inference of a mutual belief in other facts as well as 
inference of mutual understanding. 
3 0 f  course the addressee may believe that  U realizes some other proposition R. 
4Again I stress that  I do not mean that  P is conveyed directly and I use the realization assumption t o  
represent this fact(Reddy, 1979). 
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Examples of making inferences and implicatures explicit will be discussed in sections 4.1.3 and 
5.1. Section 4.2 will discuss the inference of mutual acceptance. 
4.1.1 Example of a Repetition 
Consider example 2 from section 1.1, repeated here for convenience: 
(29) ( 6) r. uh 2 tax questions. One: since April 81 we have had an 85 year old mother 
living with us. Her only income has been social security plus uh approximately three 
thousand dollars from a certificate of deposit. and I wonder what's the situation in 
terms of claiming her as a dependent, or does that income from the certificate of 
deposit rule her out as a dependent? 
( 7) h. Yes it does 
( 8 )  r. IT  DOES 
( 9) h. Yup that knocks her out. ......... 
Ray, in (a), repeats Harry's assertion from (7). This upgrades the endorsement on the hearing 
and attention assumptions associated with utterance (7) from HYPOTHESIS to LINGUISTIC. 
The realization assumption, i.e. what proposition p7 is realized by u7, remains endorsed as 
a DEFAULT because Ray merely repeated what he heard and a repetition doesn't provide any 
evidence that Ray actually understood what Harry meant. This instantiates the inference rule 
for understanding as follows: 
say(harry, ray, u7, p7) * understand(Ray, u7, p7) [absolute] 
Assumptions = attend(Ray, u7) [linguistic] 
hear(Ray, u7) [linguistic] 
bel(Ray, realize(u7, p7)) [default] 
Because of the WEAKEST L I N K  rule, the mutual belief about understanding is still a default. 
That is, the conclusion of the inference process is 
MB(understand(Ray, u7, p7)) [default] 
However, the attention and complete hearing assumptions are no longer defeasible by linguistic 
evidence. This means that it would be infelicitous for Ray later on to say Oh I didn't hear 
you say that or I thought you said that it doesn't. The next section examines the effect of a 
paraphrase on the inference of mutual understanding. 
4.1.2 Example of a Paraphrase 
Consider example 1 from section 1.1, repeated here as 30: 
4.1. MUTUAL BELIEF OF UNDERSTANDING 
(30) (18) h. I see. Are there any other children beside your wife? 
( 1 9 )  d. No 
(20) h. YOUR WIFE IS AN ONLY CHILD 
(21) d. right. and uh wants to give her some security .......... 
Harry's utterance of (20) is said with a falling intonational contour and hence is unlikely to  be 
a question. This utterance results in an instantiation of the inference rule as follows: 
say(harry, ray, u20, ~ 2 0 )  - understand(Ray, u20, p20) [absolute] 
Assumptions = attend(Ray, u7) [linguistic] 
hear(Ray, u7) [linguistic] 
bel(Ray, realize(u7, p7)) [linguistic] 
Because of the WEAKEST L I N K  rule, the mutual belief about understanding is now endorsed as 
linguistic. 
MB (underst and(Ray, u7, p7)) [linguistic] 
The belief in the achievement of mutual understanding is licensed by a LINGUISTIC endorsement 
since all of the underlying assumptions are endorsed as linguistic. Thus a paraphrase provides 
excellent evidence that an agent actually understood what another agent meant. 
4.1.3 Making Entailments Explicit 
While Consequence is given as a separate function from Attitude, there is actually an overlap 
in their functionality. I will describe here the set of cases where inferences are made explicit 
when they are adjacent to at least one of their antecedents. It should be noted however that 
these cases function communicatively for both Consequence and Attitude. 
Cases where a speaker A, intends an addressee B, to  infer Q, from an utterance that realizes a 
proposition P, can be represented by an additional assumption on the understanding inference 
rule schema. The fact that A intends B to infer Q, by saying U,  which realizes P, in a 
particular discourse situation, can be represented by an additional condition that P licenses Q 
in the situation as given below: 
say (?A, ?B, ?U, ?P) - understand(?B, ?Q) [absolute] 
Assumptions = attend (?B, ?U) [hypothesis] 
hear (?B, ?U) [hypothesis] 
believe (?B, realize(?U, ?P)) [hypothesis] 
believe (?B, licenses(?P, ?Q) [entailment] 
This new fifth assumption will be called the LICENSE assumption. As an example, consider 
example 31, repeated from section 2.3, where Harry makes an inference explicit in 31-(17). 
This inference follows from modus ponens and the previous two utterances. 
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(31) (15) h. oh no. IRA'S were available as long as you are not a participant in an existing 
pension 
(16) j. Oh I see. well I did work I do work for a company that has a pension 
(17) h. ahh. Then you're not eligible for eighty one 
According to  the model of understanding outlined in section 4.1, extended for inferences above, 
the fact that this proposition was inferable after (16), would be represented by the license 
assumption. 
believe(H, license(pl6, p17)) [entailment] 
The license assumption providing support for whether the inference is mutually believed is 
endorsed as an ENTAILMENT.  However utterance (17) upgrades the endorsement on this as- 
sumption to  LINGUISTIC. 
believc(H, license(pl6, p17)) [linguistic] 
Making an inference explicit also upgrades the ATTENTION, COMPLETE H E A R I N G ,  and RE- 
ALIZATION assumptions. Any utterance upgrades attention. The COMPLETE HEARING,  and 
REALIZATION assumptions get upgraded because it isn't possible to  make a valid inference from 
an utterance unless one heard it and understood its propositional content correctly. 
4.1.4 Summary 
Each type of IRU, the assumption addressed and the endorsement provided is given in Fig- 
ure 4.1. I consider the inferences about what is mutually believed that are licensed by the 
addressee's utterance as implicatures that arise from norms of interaction. They have the 
properties of implicatures of being both reinforceable and defeasible(Sadock, 1978). I will refer 
to these inferences as CONVERSATIONAL DEFAULTS(JOS~~  et al., 1986). Examples of the kind 
of behavior that licenses these inferences were provided in sections 4.1.1,4.1.2, and 4.1.3. 
As detailed in Figure 4.1, prompts, repetitions, paraphrases and making entailments explicit all 
provide a linguistic endorsement on the ATTENTION assumption. The only thing that prompts, 
such as uh huh, do directly is to provide a linguistic endorsement for attention. 
However repetitions, paraphrases and making entailments explicit also upgrade the endorse- 
ment on the COMPLETE HEARING assumption. This is represented by upgrading the endorse- 
ment for the complete hearing assumption to  linguistic. A repetition demonstrates complete 
hearing of the verbatim content of what was said(C1ark and Brennan, 1990). A paraphrase 
demonstrates complete hearing by showing that the verbatim content has been semailtically 
incorporated into the addressee's memory. Making an entailment explicit demonstrates com- 
plete hearing by showing that the verbatim content has been incorporated into the addressee's 
memory and that at least one inference has been performed on this content. 
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Figure 4.1: How the Addressee's Following utterance upgrades the endorsement for assump- 
tions underlying the inference of mutual understanding 
NEXT 
Utterance Type 
PROMPT 
REPETITION 
PARAPHRASE 
ENTAILMENT 
IMPLICATURE 
ANY Next 
Utterance 
In addition, a paraphrase and making an entailment explicit provide a linguistic endorsement 
for the REALIZATION assumption, of what proposition the paraphraser believes the previous 
utterance realizes. Paraphrases do this by demonstrating that  the content has been seman- 
tically incorporated into memory. Explicit entailments additionally provide evidence of what 
inferences the inferrer believes the realized proposition licenses in this situation. 
In addition, any next utterance by the addressee can upgrade the endorsements of the under- 
lying assumptions to  default. (See Figure 4.1). Of course a default endorsement is weaker than 
a linguistic endorsement. The basis for these default inferences will be discussed in section 4.2. 
ASSUMPTION 
ADDRESSED 
In each case, the IRU addresses one or more assumptions that  have t o  be made in order t o  infer 
that mutual understanding has actually been achieved. The assumption, rather than endorsed 
as a hypothesis or a default, gets upgraded t o  an endorsement type of linguistic as a result of 
the IRU. The fact tha,t different IRUs address different assumptions leads to  the perception 
that  some IRUs are better evidence for understanding than others, e.g. a paraphrase is stronger 
evidence of understanding than a repetition(C1ark and Schaefer, 1989). 
ENDORSEMENT 
T Y P E  
The model of beliefs including assumptions and endorsements is implemented in a modified 
Truth Maintenance System (TMS) based on Galliers' theory of Autonomous Belief Revision 
(ABR)(de Kleer, 1986; Cawsey et al., 1992). This will be discussed further in chapter 8 where 
the computational simulation is described. 
Other analyses of the function of these adjacent IRUs are possible. Indeed, they may function 
to  maintain a proposition as salient as much as provide evidence of understanding. This is 
attention linguistic 
a t  tention, hearing linguistic 
attention, hearing, realize linguistic 
attention, hearing, realize, license 1 linguistic 
attention, hearing, realize, license 1 linguistic 
attention, hearing, realize, license default 
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actually supported by the fact that of all the adjacent IRUs in the corpus, none of them are 
matched by examples where the addressee actually got it wrong. In other words, there are no 
cases of attempts at adjacent repetitions or paraphrases that demonstrate that the addressee 
misunderstood what the speaker had said(Tannen, 1989). This highlights a potential overlap 
in the Attitude and Attention functions which will be explored in the simulation experiments 
described in chapter 8. 
4.2 Acceptance and Rejection 
In section 4.1, I suggested that the assumption that an utterance always achieves the intended 
effect, should be replaced by adopting a model in which agents' behavior provides evidence for 
whether or not mutual belief has been achieved. I used the achievement of mutual belief of 
understanding as an example of how monitoring the evidence supplied by the next utterance 
can license the inference of mutual belief. I argued that local management of these processes is 
more than a convention; local management lets resource-bounded agents achieve mutual belief 
efficiently. 
But in many discourse situations agents want to  do more than achieve mutual understanding. 
It is important to  distinguish an agent actually ACCEPTING the belief that P or intending 
to perform an action described by P, from merely UNDERSTANDING that P was conveyed. 
Some accounts legislate that helpful agents should adopt others' beliefs and intentions (Cohen 
and Levesque, 1990; Litman and Allen, 1990). A more sophisticated approach using default 
logic maintains that acceptance depends on whether or not the agent previously believed TP 
(Perrault, 1990; Grosz and Sidner, 1990). These are simplifying assumptions: agents are 
autonomous and can decide whether, as well as how, to revise their beliefs (Galliers, 1991b). 
Achieving understanding and compensating for resource-bounds are issues for a model of di- 
alogue whether or not agents are autonomous. However agents' autonomy means there are a 
number of other reasons why A's utterance to  B, intending to  convey P, might not achieve its 
intended effect: (1) P may not cohere with B's beliefs; (2) B may not think that P is relevant; 
(3)  B may believe that P does not contribute to  the mutual goal; (4) B may prefer doing or 
believing some Q where P is mutually exclusive with Q, (5) if P is about an action, B may 
want to  partially modify P with additional constraints about how, or when P. 
Yet, as I noted earlier, it is rarely the case that explicit evidence of agreement is given by 
an utterance such as I agree. And, typically, the same forms that are used to  convey simply 
understanding, may convey agreement (but see (Hockey, 1991)). So how do agents achieve 
mutual belief of acceptance when acceptance is necessary? My hypothesis is that a mutual 
belief that 'acceptance is necessary' determines how this process works. Just as goals constrain 
the way instructions are understood and evaluated(Pollack, 1986; Di Eugenio, 1992), mutual 
goals constrain whether an utterance licenses the inference of mutual acceptance. It must be 
mutually believed that acceptance of the utterance is necessary t o  achieve the mutual goal in 
order for an inference of acceptance to be licensed. When this situation holds, acceptance can 
be inferred via the operation of a simple principle of cooperative d i a l~gue .~ :  
5This is a simplification of the COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PRINCIPLES described in (Whittaker and Stenton, 
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COLLABORATIVE PRINCIPLE: Conversants must provide evidence of a detected dis- 
crepancy in belief as soon as possible. 
The collaborative principle is an instance of a general rule incumbent on a cooperative con- 
versant to  prevent his/her co-conversant from making false inferences(Joshi, 1982; Joshi et al., 
1986). This principle claims that evidence of conflict should be made apparent in order to 
keep DEFAULT inferences about acceptance or understanding from going through. Without i t ,  
a conversant might not bring up an objection until much later in the conversation, a t  which 
point the relevant belief and some inferences following from that belief will have been added 
to the common ground as DEFAULTS. The retraction of that belief may result in many beliefs 
having to  be revised. Or worse, according to the Principle of Positive Undermining(Harman, 
1986; Galliers, 1991b), some of these faulty beliefs may never be successfully retracted. 
The principle claim of this section is that there is a large subset of IRUs that cannot function 
as evidence for conflicts in beliefs or intentions via their propositional content, i.e. they cannot 
function as evidence of rejection of another speaker's utterance. This follows fairly directly from 
the fa,ct that they are informationally redundant, but there are some additional constraints: 
(1) they are adjacent to their antecedent; (2) the other conversant said the antecedent; (3) 
they are said with broad focus; (4) they are said with a falling boundary tone; (5) they must 
include the information focus of the antecedent if the IRU is a repetition. This will be discussed 
further below. 
As an example of the inference of mutual acceptance, consider Mary's utterances of yes, alright 
or I see in 32-(471, (491, (531, and (55). According to  the proposal here, these cannot function 
to  reject Harry's previous assertion, nor can Harry's ok in (50) and (56). 
(32) (46) h. Ok, the remaining roughly ninety thousand 
(47) m. Yes 
(48) h. I would like to see that in two different, municipal bond funds, that are 
variable rate funds 
(49) m. Yes 
(50) h. Ok 
(51) m. Heard you telling another person that a couple of calls back 
(52) h. Right. There are a number of variable rate municipal bond funds floating 
around. Contact your broker and ask him to recommend a couple of them 
(53) n ~ .  Alright 
(54) h. And they will maintain their value approximately because they are variable 
rate funds 
(55) ni. I see 
(56) h. Ok 
(57) m. Fine 
Since in this situation, I assume that Harry and Mary have a mutual goal of Mary accepting the 
advice that Harry offers to  address her problem, the inference of mutual acceptance is licensed 
1988; Walker and Whittaker, 1990). 
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by the fact that Mary doesn't provide evidence of rejection when she has an opportunity to 
do so. 
Some researchers have argued that PROMPTS have propositional content of their own, such as 
I agree(Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Cohen et al., 1990; Levesque et al., 1990). On these accounts 
it is necessary to  provide such explicit evidence of agreement or understanding. But the 
account here is that acceptance is inferred from the fact that nothing was said to  indicate 
non-acceptance. One way in which non-acceptance can be recognized is discussed in the next 
section. 
4.2.1 Implicit Rejection and Given/New 
I've claimed that adjacent IRUs always indicate acceptance, but I've limited this claim by a 
number of constraints on these IRUs. These constraints were given in section 4.2. One of the 
constraints, (5), was that the IRU must include the information focus of its antecedent. This 
section examines cases where constraint ( 5 )  is violated since it illustrates a general fact about 
the nature of demonstrating acceptance. It also shows that inferring a rejection depends on 
the given-new structure of the utterances in a dialogue. 
Hirschberg demonstrated how disagreements (rejections) can be inferred as a special case of 
scalar implicatures(Hirschberg, 1985). This inference depends on identifying two utterances as 
differing by alternate values of a scale. Generally this means that these utterances will differ 
in what the new information is in the second utterance, and thus one factor in recognizing the 
scalar implicature is identifying the new information in an utterance(Rubinoff, 1987). However, 
the phenomenon seems to  be slightly more general than this, as captured by condition (5). 
Consider the following example from (Levinson, 1979): 
(33) A: There's a man in the garage. 
B: There's something in the garage. 
Utterance 33B violates condition (5). In this case the propositional content of B's utterance is 
an entailment of A's utterance, B's utterance meets conditions (1) through (4) above for IRUs 
providing evidence of understanding and acceptance, and yet B's utterance actually serves as a 
rejection of A's. I claim that the reason it does so is because it does not realize the information 
focus of A's utterance. Consider the attested example in 34: 
(34) A. We bought these pajamas in New Orleans for me. 
B. We bought these pajamas in New Orleans. (LW 5/24/92) 
A's utterance was said with the phrase for me marked as new information, the information 
focus. When B repeats all of the utterance except for the information focus, B implicates that 
B rejects the main predication of A's utterance. 
This means that a representation of utterance meaning for dialogues between autonomous 
agents will have to represent and reason about given and new information in order to  accurately 
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represent the way non-acceptance functions in naturally occurring dialogues. The information 
that will license the inference of rejection cannot be coded as logical inconsistency alone. 
There is no sense in which the B utterances in 33 and 34 are logically inconsistent with the 
A utterances. However, the inference of rejection is beyond the scope of this thesis. I merely 
note here that it would require access to  information of three types: (1) logical inconsistency; 
(2) the notion of alternate members of a set (Hirschberg, 1985); and (3) Given/New structure. 
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Chapter 
Lonseauence 
The second set of hypotheses about the function of IRUs involve Consequence: t o  augment the 
evidence supporting mutual beliefs that certain inferences are licensed, or t o  provide a context 
in which an inference is more easily made. What do I mean by the distinction between these 
two cases? 
Consider P, an antecedent of an inference rule, Q a consequent, and an inference rule that  can 
be expressed roughly as P -+ Q. There are two states that  an agent might be in with respect 
to  making an inference. An agent may: 
1. Believe P and Believe P i Q, and have t o  infer Q 
2. Believe P and Believe Q, and have to  infer P + Q. 
In both cases the inference can be made explicit. Examples of the first case, where Q is 
stated, were discussed as making entailments and implicatures explicit in sections 2.3 and 
2.5. I characterized these as upgrading the endorsement on the LICENSE assumption and 
gave an example in section 4.1.3. The inferences that I considered were limited to  those 
motivated by inference rule schenzas like modus ponens, or linguistically based inferences like 
scalar implicatures, where the information on which the inference depends is provided in the 
dialogue. 
I have not yet discussed examples of the second case where an agent must infer P + Q. These 
will be discussed below. The point of examining different types of inferences is that  a goal 
of the proposed work is t o  determine the following: under what circumstances is it beneficial 
for an agent t o  make an inference explicit or perform some utterance action that  functions 
t o  make it 'easier' for another agent t o  make an inference? Determining the answer t o  this 
question requires a specific proposal about agents' resource-bounded reasoning mechanisms. I 
will leave the description of this mechanism until chapter 8. Here I discuss the second type of 
inference further. 
The second case is complicated by the fact that  the symbol + actually refers to  a number of 
different relations that  can hold between propositions that  describe actions or beliefs. These 
4 8 CHAPTER 5. CONSEQUENCE 
relations are often characterized as simply being modus ponens relations, but agents in all 
probability make much finer distinctions. Taxonomies have been proposed for these distinctions 
as 'propositional relations' or 'coherence relations'(Hobbs, 1979; Cohen, 1987). Determining 
whether a relation holds sometimes depends on information about the domain, but it is the 
linguistic context that  licenses the inference of these relations. At times a speaker may explicitly 
provide clues about what inferences are intended through the use of cue words such as because. 
However, it seems that some cases of IRUs function to  make it 'easier' for an agent to  infer 
these propositional relations. 
I adopt a small set of propositional relations that  are adequate for my purposes: CONTRIBUTE, 
SUPPORT and WARRANT.  This is a very rudimentary set of relations and each relation could 
be made more precise(Hobbs, 1979; McKeown, 1985; Di Eugenio, 1992; Balkanski, 1990). 
However, the purpose of modeling the process of achieving a collaborative plan doesn't require 
precise versions of these relations. 
I use the CONTRIBUTE relation t o  describe a relation between two actions P and Q, where 
the performance of P leads t o  the achievement of Q (Grosz and Sidner, 1986). This very 
roughly means that  performing P may enable performing Q, as laying the carpet CONTRIBUTES 
to  furnishing the house. The CONTRIBUTE relation also relates actions where performing P 
results in having performed Q, e.g. flipping the switch results in turning on the light(Pollack, 
1986). 
The relation SUPPORT describes a relation between two beliefs where a belief in one supports 
a belief in the other(Grosz and Sidner, 1986). This characterizes the cases I have discussed 
of inferences where a belief Q is inferred from a belief P. In example 24, let P be Joe had a 
pension plan for 1981 and Q be Joe is not eligible for an  IRA for 1981. Then P SUPPORTS Q. 
Finally, I introduce a new relation called WARRANT t o  describe a relation between a belief and 
an intention, where the belief is meant to  be a reason for adopting an intention. For example 
your belief that  chocolate is good for you may warrant adopting an  intention t o  eat chocolate. 
The WARRANT relation is needed since agents are autonomous and reason about which goals 
they wish t o  adopt, rather than being given goals(Pollack, 1991). 
In terms of the two types of propositions discussed in section 5.1, these three relations describe 
three different combina.tions of propositions: (CONTRIBUTE act-prop act-prop); (SUPPORT bel- 
prop bel-prop); and (WARRANT bel-prop act-prop). The previous sections gave examples of 
the SUPPORTS relation between two beliefs. The remainder of this section will give examples 
of the WARRANT and CONTRIBUTE relations. 
5.1 Inferring Propositional Relations 
This section describes a number of examples of IRUs t o  motivate the second aspect of the 
Consequence function of IRUs, the inference of propositional relations. Certain instances of 
IRUs seem to  be said just so that  a propositional relation can be inferred. The inference of 
these relations seems to  depend on an IRU realizing a proposition P, occurring sequentially very 
close to  an utterance realizing a proposition Q, where a propositional relation holds between 
P aad Q(Hobbs, 1985; Hobbs and Martin, 1987). For example consider the following excerpt 
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that  was part of a discussion about where t o  eat lunch: 
(35) (1) Listen to  Ramesh. 
(2) HE'S INDIAN. (DH, Nov 5, 91) 
The discussion involved a mutual goal to  instantiate X in the proposition W e  should eat at 
restaurant X of type Indian. Doing the action given in (1) is meant to  CONTRIBUTE to this 
mutual goal, and the addressees were meant to  infer a propositional relation between (1) and 
(2). The proposition in (2) Ramesh is  Indian, which all the conversants already believed, was 
intended t o  serve as a WARRANT for adopting the goal given in (l)(Webber and Joshi, 1982). 
Similarly, consider the following dialogue, repeated from section 2.3.1. Here Mary (ni) tells 
Harry (h) that  she and her husband are both retired in (43), and a number of other facts about 
their financial situation in successive dialogue from (43) to  (45). 
(36) (42) h. Now what is your income situation 
(43) m. We're both retired and our income for the year is about urn 24 about 26 
thousand 
(44) h. Have you other securities than stock? have you any bonds or certificates? 
(45) m. Yes yes we do. We have some certificates oh about uh 15 - 20 thousand, not 
much we're not rich - and we have a house completely paid for, have some land in the 
poconos, completely paid for - and uh that's actually the extent of our uh 
(46) h. Ok. On the proceeds of that gm stock 
(47) m. yes 
(48) h. I'd like to  see you put that  into two different southern utilities 
(clarification of southern utilities) 
(58) h. and those I think that  you will find that that  will give you a good return, 
YOU ARE RETIRED and that  is primarily what you are looking for, addition I think 
that  eventually those stocks will rise as we U....... 
Beginning with (46) Harry suggests a course of action. In (58) he tells Mary something that 
she told him in (43), you are retired. However Harry's statement in this context leads to  an 
inference of a warrant relation between that  fact and the proposed course of action. In other 
words, Harry is implying that X is retired warrants X wants a good return on her investment. 
More precisely let: 
A = Invest proceeds of GM stock in 2 different southern utilities 
P = You are retired 
G = Get a good return on your investment 
Then what Mary is supposed to  infer is that: (1) P WARRANTS G, and (2) A CONTRIBUTES to 
achieving G. Since Mary believes P, she may adopt G as a goal, and then intend to do A to 
contribute t o  achieving G. 
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Finally consider another case of making an entailment explicit, non-adjacent to the entailment's 
antecedent(s). In the following segment, Jane (j) describes her financial situation to  Harry (h) 
and a choice between a settlement and an annuity. 
(37) ( 1) j. Hello Harry, my name is Jane ( 2) h. Welcome Jane 
( 3) j. I just retired december first, and in addition to my pension and social security, 
I have a supplemental annuity 
( 4) h. Yes 
( 5) j. which I contributed to while I was employed 
( 6) h. right 
( 7) j. from the state of New Jersey mutual fund. and I'm entitled to  a lump sum 
settlement which would be between 16,800 and 17,800 or a lesser life annuity. and the 
choices of the annuity u m  would be $125.45 per month. that would be the maximum 
with no beneficiaries 
( 8) h. You can stop right there: take your money 
( 9) j. Take the money 
(10) h. Absolutely. YOU'RE ONLY GETTING 1500 A YEAR. at 17,000, no trouble 
at all to get 10 percent on 17,000 bucks. ........ 
Harry interrupts her at (8) since he believes he has enough information to suggest a course 
of action, and tells her take your money. To provide a WARRANT for this course of action 
he produces an inference that follows from what she has told him in (7), namely You're only 
getting 1500 (dollars) a year. 
Presumably Jane would have no trouble calculating that $125.45 a month for 12 months 
amounts to  a little over $1500 a year. However the juxtaposition of this fact against the advice 
to take the money licenses the inference that the fact that she is only getting 1500 dollars a 
year, is a WARRANT for adopting a goal to  take the money(Levinson, 1979). 
This adoption of the advice relies on the assumption that agents reason about the utility of 
performing certain actions as opposed to  others. Agents deliberate with a general rule that 
if one course of action, A, produces greater benefits than another course of action, B, pursue 
A over B. A delibention mechanism such as this is part of the computational simulation 
presented in chapter 8. 
All of the cases of Consequence discussed so far are IRUs that are not adjacent to their 
antecedent. This distributional fact might be taken to  be an identifying characteristic of this 
type of IRU. Then, according to the model of limited attention developed here, the motivation 
for the IRU would be that the propositional content of the IRU must be salient, but it is in fact 
not currently attended to. The point of the IRU is then to  make that proposition currently 
salient. 
A potential counter-example to this view of Consequence is provided in 38. This case is different 
from the previously considered examples because the addressee's inference process is cued by 
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the use of a conditional.' In addition, it would be difficult to  argue that the redundant clause 
in 38-(20) isn't currently salient since it has just been discussed: 
(38) (16) h. Alright how does the income break down? 
(17 )  d. About two thirds to one third 
(18) h. The two thirds I may I assume is yours? 
( 1 9 )  d. Right 
(20) h. If THE TWO THIRDS IS YOURS, you can get two thirds of the taxes and 
the interest 
(21) d. Will there be any problem in the future, let's say if her income should increase 
and the percentage changes? 
In terms of the relevant actions and beliefs, we have: 
A = Deduct two thirds of the taxes and the interest 
Q = You can deduct two thirds of the taxes and two thirds of the interest 
P = Two thirds of the income is yours 
G = Minimize taxes, maximize income 
The inferences that are licensed are that A contributes to  achieving G and P SUPPORTS Q. Q 
is a qualifier for when action A can be taken(Schoppers, 1988). Qualifiers are conditions for 
when an action is applicable but don't correspond to conditions that can be achieved by an 
agent. 
The reason that the antecedent is explicitly restated here, even though it is presumably cur- 
rently a.ttended to, is because Harry wishes to  make a stronger statement. In the previous 
cases the inference of the rule has not been made explicit. According to the model of beliefs 
developed in chapter 3, this means that the inference rule is only endorsed as a d e f a ~ l t . ~  In 
this case, Harry can give the inference rule a linguistic endorsement. This follows from the fact 
that the relation between P and Q is a general rule, in fact part of the tax code, and Harry 
wants to communicate this fact. 
There is an additional processing motivation for using IRUs as warraats for adopting goals or 
as supports for adopting beliefs. In this type of dialogue, the discussion centers on proposed 
future actions and beliefs that support one course of action over another. Yet agents do 
not necessarily share beliefs about actions and their role in contributing to different goals, 
and because agents are autonomous, the acceptance of a proposed course of action is not 
guaranteed. Therefore, while an agent may infer that a proposition is meant to  serve as a 
warrant for adopting a proposed course of action, whether she does in fact accept the warrant 
is a separate issue(Webber and Joshi, 1982). Further reasoning or interaction may be required. 
However if the proposition that is intended to serve as a warrant is already accepted, then 
no further reasoning with respect to that proposition is required. This provides an excellent 
 his kind of conditional is unusual in that  it violates commonly accepted felicity conditions on conditionals, 
which include that  the antecedent be unknown. 
21'm not sure whether these should be considered relevance implicatures, but it is clear that  they are weaker 
than entailments. 
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motivation for using already accepted facts in dialogue about future a ~ t i o n . ~  
5.2 Alternates Relation 
There is one relation between propositions that I did not discuss in the previous section because 
it is not clear to  me whether in fact this relation has the same status as the propositional 
relations discussed there. I will call this the ALTERNATES relation. 
What I mean by an alternate is that the IRU affirms a particular member of a salient partially 
ordered set as instantiating a salient open proposition(Prince, 1986). Many cases of IRUs are 
reaffirmations of sentences that are alternate sentences in the context in which they appear. 
As an example of the alternates relation, consider the excerpt below: 
(39) (30) h. Is he self-employed? 
(31) 1. Yes 
(32) h. I'm sorry, i missed that 
(33) 1. Yes he is. 
(34) h. Ok. Well why not start for him a Keogh plan? You can't get an IRA after 70, 
but YOU CAN GET A KEOGH PLAN 
In (34) above, the first clause presumes that you can start a Keogh Plan. The second statement 
you can't get an I R A  after 70 alternates with the final one you can get a Keogh plan (after 
70). The pair of IRA,  Keogh plan are alternates elements of a domain and task specific set 
defined by the property retirement plans. The salient open proposition is You can (?X; polarity 
variable) get a (?Y, of type pension plan). 
In the following case, a linearly ordered set is evoked of no charges, low charges, reasonable 
charges, excessive charges. 
(40) (22) b. Are there ah .. I don't think the ah brokerage charge will be ah that excessive 
(23) h. No they're not excessive but THERE ARE CHARGES 
Harry denies that a high member of this set holds, i.e. excessive charges, but affirms that the 
lowest member, no charges, does not hold. 
There are a number of cases that seem to be related to argument structure and to  providing 
support for an argument, or quite commonly, to  stating why the speaker cannot provide support 
for an argument. Horn call these cases RHETORICAL O P P O S I T I O N ( W ~ ~ ~ ,  1990; Horn, 1991); 
this notion is partially characterized by a condition of ARGUMENTATIVE DISTINCTNESS: 
An informationally redundant affirmation Q will be discourse acceptable if it counts 
as ARGUMENTATIVELY DISTINCT from P in the sense that where P counts as an 
argument for a conclusion R, Q represents or argues for an opposite conclusion R'. 
3Cohen also argues that  using IRUs helps hearers' processing. Since an IRU cannot be used as a claim, it 
must be used as evidence for a claim(Cohen, 1987). 
5.2. ALTERNATES RELATION 5 3 
It seems that this condition is too strong. It doesn't cover cases where the speaker states that 
he cannot provide evidence to  support his claim as in example 41 below, said by a person 
leading another along a path in the woods: 
(41) A. Something has been through here. 
I don't know if it was a deer or what, but SOMETHING HAS. (LW 7/8/92) 
Examples like this might be considered affirmations related to  an evidential ordering. In the 
following example, the affirmation in (26) may evoke such an evidential ordering. The evidence 
would support the truth of Harry's assertion that there's a line for it. 
(42) (26) h. well you'll have to  list that as interest earned 
and then you can knock that amount off somewhere on schedule b, 
there's a line for it,  
i don't remember what the line number is, 
BUT IT'S TIIERE 
Harry's statement that he doesn't remember what the line number is fails to  provide support 
for the fact that there is a line number, but it doesn't strictly argue against the existence of 
the line. Rather the use of the term the line number seems to presuppose the existence of said 
line. The ordering, if there is one, evoked here, could also be characterized as an entailment 
ordering since remembering what the line number is entails the existence of a line. 
Many of these IRUs seem to be a reflex of a reasoning process that is comparing different states 
of belief and different courses of action. A number of hypotheses about the function of IRUs 
characterized by the alternates relation are possible: 
0 Reinforcement: the speaker may wish to reinforce a scalar implicature of P, namely Q. 
a Set Construction: The speaker may wish to  help the hearer actually construct the set that 
at scalar implicature could be based on, by putting set members in syntactic positions 
that are constrained to  be related by a poset relation(Prince, 1986; Ward and Prince, 
1991). 
a Block Inferences: The speaker may intend to block inferences that he believes the hearer 
may make, such as generalization inferences(Joshi et al., 1984). 
a Discourse Salience: They may function at the attentional level. By affirming P, a speaker 
leaves P rather than Q as the most salient proposition. 
a Deliberation Reflex: these are essentially a speaker-provided protocol of a reasoning 
process about arguments and counter-arguments for beliefs or intentions. 
The structure that is most commonly seen could result from a combination of these facts. For 
example a combination of deliberation and discourse salience could motivate example 42. This 
also seems to  be the case in example 43 asserted by a passenger in a vehicle in response to the 
driver's comment that the heavy traffic was unexpected: 
CHAPTER 5. CONSEQUENCE 
(43) There's something on fire up there. 
I can't see what's on fire, 
but SOMETHING IS. (LW 6/12/92) 
In this case, the second clause presupposes that something is on fire but the speaker is saying 
that she can't provide evidence to support her assertion. Perhaps she thinks that the hearer 
expects that such support should be provided. Then she returns to  the main point that she 
intends to be discourse salient, by reaffirming her assertion(Sclziffrin, 1982). 
All the propositional relations that I discuss in the previous section are parasitic on the be- 
lief/intention structure, yet it isn't clear whether the alternates relation relates beliefs and 
intentions or whether it is a meta-level relation comparing beliefs t o  other beliefs and possible 
intentions to  potential other courses of action. 
Since I haven't yet determined the function of the alternates relation, I cannot include examples 
like these as part of the computational implementation described in chapter 8. However, agents 
mill reason about alternative courses of action and this may capture some of the cases of what 
I have called alternates here. 
5.3 Summary 
This section discussed the Consequence function of IRUs. I suggested that agents may make 
inferences explicit to  provide public evidence that these inferences are licensed in the context. 
This can demonstrate that the agent made this inference or can ensure that another agent 
made the desired inference. 
The propositional relations of CONTRIBUTE, SUPPORT and WARRANT are used to  relate the 
beliefs and intentions that are discussed in the dialogue, and specifies the way in which these 
are combined together to form a collaborative plan. An agent may a produce an IRU so that 
one of these relations will be inferred to hold between the propositional content of that IRU 
and another proposition that is locally salient. 
The next cha,pter discusses the final hypothesis, that some IRUs are a reflex of limited attention 
as agents' engage in purposeful dialogues. 
Chapter 6 
Attention 
The final set of hypotheses are about Attention. The basic hypothesis is that IRUs may 
function to  manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by making or keeping 
a proposition salient. The fact that this is a communicative function follows from the limits 
on attention discussed in section 1.2 and the relation of attention to  inference. 
Arguably, every utterance functions to manipulate the locus of attention. It seems that the 
most recent utterance is usually most salient, but propositions that are frequently used should 
also be more salient. Here I discuss examples that function mainly at the attentional level in 
order to illustrate the attention function clearly. 
Since attention is limited, agents must manage what goes into and gets removed from the set of 
items currently attended to as the discourse proceeds. This means that agents are motivated 
to coordinate with one another occasions when items can be swapped out of the current 
focus space. This coordination avoids misunderstandings that result from agents assuming 
different contexts. IRUs that function to introduce a topic or to  close a topic demonstrate this 
coordination(Wa1ker and Whittaker, 1990). For instance, consider this example from section 
2.3.3 of making an entailment explicit. Note that I have labelled each sentence in Harry's turn 
at (31) separately, so that each sentence in the turn can be referred to. 
(44) ( 2 8 )  j. I also have ten thousand in a C D' six month C D 
(29) h. oh uh hang on do you have anything else? 
(30) j. that that's it. that's it. 
(31a) h.wel1 now we're talking about something slightly different. 
(31b) YOU ALREADY HAVE SOME MONEY IN A C D. 
(31c) have you anyone dependent on you? 
In (31b), Harry produces an IRU whose antecedent is in (28). The use of now in (31a) provides 
support for the claim that (31a) begins a new discourse segment. The IRU in (31b) mea.ns that 
(31b) is to  be part of attentional state for the following segment. The second type of attention 
examples are end-of-segment summaries as in 45-(24) below: 
'Certificate of Deposit 
5 5 
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(45) ( 7) c. Ok Harry, I'm have a problem that uh my - with today's economy my daughter 
is working - 
( 8) h. I missed your name 
( 9) c. Hank 
(10) h. Go ahead hank 
(11) c. as well as her uh husband. They have a child and they bring the child to us 
every day for babysitting. This is while she works 
(12) h. um hm 
(13) c. Now we're wondering how can we handle this to help them get a tax deduction 
and at the same time uh have my wife uh compensated for it uh so she can maybe 
claim social security payments or something 
(14) h. Well she's in a position where she can run herself as a self-employed individual 
in this regard. But there's one problem. you're gonna have to pay income tax on that 
money. 
(15) c. That's ok 
(16) h. You know what's good for them may not be good for you. 
(17) c. Well the may I feel that uh if it comes to say $2000 a year 
(18) h. What is the situation. one child? 
(19) c. One child. yes. 
(20) h. Right. The maximum amount of credit that you will be able to  get will be 
400 that they will be able to get will be 400 dollars on their tax return 
(21) c. 400 dollars for the whole year? 
(22) h. Yeah it'll be 20% 
(23) c. urn hm 
(24) h. Now if indeed they pay the $2000 to your wife, that's great. 
(25) c. urn hm 
(26) h. SO WE HAVE $400. Now as far as you are concerned that could cost you 
more. Remember you're gonna have 2000 worth of income. What's your tax bracket? 
The end of segment function of the IRU in 45-(26) is correlated with the use of the cue word 
so with the IRU and the cue word now on the following utterance(Schiffrin, 1987; Grosz and 
Sidner, 1986). In this case Harry sums up the conclusion of the previous segment, which is 
that pursuing a potential course of action could result in a gain of 400 dollars. He then begins 
another segment of dialogue to  compare this potential gain with the potential increase in taxes. 
The summary functions to  coordinate the attention of the discourse participants before the 
transition to  the new segment. 
The following dialogue illustrates a return to a previous discourse segment through the use of 
an IRU. Eleanor (e) describes her current investments, and then states her question in (3).  
(46) ( 3) e. ..... 
- and I was wondering - should I continue on with the certificates or 
( 4) h. Well it's difficult to tell because we're so far away from any of them - but I 
would suggest this - if all of these are 6 month certificates and I presume they are 
( 5 )  e. yes 
( 6) h. then I would like to see you start spreading some of that money around 
( 7 )  e. uh hu 
( 8) h. Now in addition, how old are you? 
(discussion and advice about starting an IRA) 
(21) e. uh huh and 
(22) h. But as far as the certificates are concerned, I'D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT 
A LITTLE BIT - THEY'RE ALL 6 MONTH CERTIFICATES 
(23) e. yes 
(24) h. and I don't like putting all my eggs in one basket - 
and I would suspect that february 25 would be a good time to put it into something 
that runs for 2 and a half years. 
that first one that comes due. Call me on the others as they come due ...... 
This is a common pattern: propositional material discussed in (4) to (6) is reintroduced into 
the conversation in (22). I claim that the purpose of the reintroduction is to  reinstantiate these 
propositions in attentional state. One point of interest here is whether the clause but as far as 
the certificates are concerned is adequate to function in and of itself as a marker of a return to 
a previous context. It seems that it should be. In which case the function of the IRUs given 
above is not to  mark the return per se, but rather to  select particular propositions from that 
context as currently salient. 
Note that the Attention functions are partially characterized by the fact that the IRU is 
remote from its antecedent. Unlike referential discourse entities that can be referred to  later in 
a dialogue with definite referring expressions, it is difficult to  use a reduced form to reintroduce 
propositional conteat(Webber, 1986); paraphrases are the main way that such reintroduction 
is done. 
The following chapter discusses distributional patterns in the corpus and the way in which 
these provide support for the proposed hypotheses. 
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Chapter 7 
Corpus Analysis 
The initial analysis includes a qualitative analysis of just over a 1000 instances of IRUs from 
the HG corpus. This qualitative analysis is what has given rise to  the hypotheses discussed in 
the previous chapters. I have begun t o  supplement this qualitative analysis with a distribu- 
tional analysis. The point of a distributional analysis is t o  test whether a set of independent 
parameters can serve as diagnostics for the proposed communicative functions of IRUs. The 
preliminary analysis presented here is based on 163 IRUs from 24 dialogues (982 utterances). 
Section 7.1 will discuss some of the distributional properties and the preliminary analysis. 
Section 7.2 will discuss which of my claims can be supported by a distributional analysis on 
this type of corpus and which cannot. 
7.1 Distributional Properties 
Consider the simple property of the location of the IRU with respect to  its antecedent. The 
antecedent may be: 
within the same turn of the speaker, SELF 
adjacent to  the IRU, in the previous turn of another speaker, ADJACENT 
8 in the last turn of the speaker, i.e. there is one intervening turn by another speaker, 
LAST 
remote from the IRU, in a turn that was prior t o  the last turn of the speaker, REMOTE 
The location property alone picks out interesting semantic categories in the data. See Figure 
7.1. 
These early results indicate that: 
1. Repetitions are most likely t o  be adjacent, (42 out of 61) 
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Figure 7.1: The distribution of various types of IRUs with respect t o  their location 
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2. Paraphrases are more likely to  be remote, (28 out of 60) 
3. Logical inferences are often adjacent, (22 out of 34) 
4. Lasts are most often paraphrases, (15 out of 25) 
2 
42 
The fact that  repetitions are most often adjacent to  their antecedents weakly supports the 
hypothesized Attitude function, since utterances related t o  Attitude must occur soon after 
their antecedents. Repetitions may also be more likely to be adjacent because memory for 
verbatim content is lost very quickly(Anderson, 1974). In addition, 35 out of the 42 adjacent 
repetitions are elliptical and only realize the information focus of their antecedent. 
15 
An IRU remote from its antecedent cannot have Attitude as its communicative function. The 
fact that  Paraphrases are likely to  be remote provides weak support for an analysis in which 
paraphrases function to  manipulate Attention. However the fact that  these are paraphrases 
rather than repetitions may only be a reflex of the fact that memory for verbatim content is 
lost very quickly. 
2 
15 
11 
6 1 
The fact that  many of the logical inferences are adjacent t o  an antecedent supports the claim 
that inferences must be made on propositions that  are currently salient, as well as the claim 
that inferences can be used to  demonstrate understanding. 
7 
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8 
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Finally, the fact that  Lasts are most often paraphrases demonstrates the function of Lasts 
as a recovery strategy when the speaker has reason to  believe that  she did not succeed in 
communicating what she wished t o  communicate. A natural recovery strategy in this context 
is to  simply try again. Apparently speakers believe that paraphrasing an utterance increases 
the likelihood of success. I don't attribute this fact to  lack of salience since it would be 
surprising if an utterance currently under discussion was not currently salient. 
5 
2 2 
1 
2 1 
Figure 7.2 adds another parameter to  those in figure 7.1, namely whether Harry or the Caller 
produced the IRU (H/C). The speaker parameter tests whether Harry produces IRUs in com- 
pletely different situations than the caller does. 
8 
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Figure 7.2: The distribution of various types of IRUs with respect to their location and speaker 
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The fact that Harry produces most of the paraphrases and is the one making inferences ex- 
plicit is consistent with Harry trying to  support inferences he wishes the caller t o  make and 
manipulating the caller's attention. Since he is the one with most of the domain knowledge, he 
is proposing and supporting the details of the collaborative plan. Figure 7.2 also shows that 
the caller produces a disproportionate number of the adjacent repetitions. 
While a common intuition is that adjacent repetitions function as questions, an examination 
of boundary tones on adjacent repetitions shows that the majority are neither syntactically 
nor intonationally marked as questions. See Figure 7.3. 
Repetitions 
H / C  
Figure 7.3: Boundary Tones on Adjacent Repetitions 
Paraphrases 
II/ C 
Rising 
Falling or Level 
Other parameters not discussed here include whether the IRU stands in a propositional relation 
to another proposition, and whether it is said with narrow or broad focus. The distribution 
of cue words with IRUs, and how many antecedents an IRU has, partially identifies IRUs that 
function on the Attentional level. If an IRU has more than one antecedent, and is remote from 
its antecedent, then it is likely t o  be an end of segment summary. I have not yet tested whether 
IRUs that function at the Attentional level reliably co-occur with discourse phenomena that can 
be used as indirect indicators of segment boundaries such as cue words anaphora distribution, 
and topline variation (Sidner, 1979; Walker and Whittaker, 1990). 
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I intend to  expand this distributional analysis as part of the proposed work. The most difficult 
part of the analysis is finding and marking IRUs and their antecedents in the transcripts 
since there are no automatic procedures for finding semantically related material. This has 
already been completed for approximately 1000 IRUs in the HG corpus, of which only 163 
were discussed here. 
7.2 Claims that are difficult to demonstrate with a distribu- 
t ional analysis 
Using the HG corpus to  support all my claims would prove to be difficult. For certain lly- 
potheses, there are two problems with the corpus: 
The only possible measure of performance is the length of the dialogue and there is only 
one dialogue for each problem configuration. This means that it is difficult to substantiate 
any claims concerning increased problem solving efficiency that may be provided by IRUs 
since there is no comparison set. 
r It is necessary to  adopt a limited definition of inference in characterizing the class of IRUs 
examined here because it is not possible to  verify what domain knowledge is shared. This 
limits cases of making inferences explicit to those based on information in the dialogue 
and linguistically motivated examples, but it would be desirable to have more tokens of 
this type. 
Thus it is difficult to imagine tests to support the claims of IRUs functioning to manage 
resources such as limited attentionand inference and to  achieve understanding and acceptance, 
by resource-limited agents. This is because I am making claims about the mental states of the 
participants in a dialogue and it is difficult to  imagine what kind of behavior could, for example, 
directly support the idea of different endorsements for beliefs. In addition, it is unclear how one 
would measure the benefit of using a particular strategy. For instance a conservative strategy 
should reduce the potential for misunderstanding. However, how could one calculate whether 
this produced fewer misunderstandings than there would have been otherwise? My conclusion 
is that an implementation of an explicit processing model as proposed in the next section is 
the only way to validate my processing claims. 
Chapter 8 
Computational Simulation 
My claims are that INFORMATIONALLY R E D U N D A N T  utterances, IRUs, are related to processing 
limitations and that they demonstrate how agents engaged in problem-solving dialogues cope 
with resource-bounds. I focus on a particular instance of dialogue: mixed-initiative, task- 
oriented dialogues between autonomous agents. The result of the dialogue is a collaborative 
plan, i.e. a constellation of mutual beliefs and intentions that will satisfy the agents' mutual 
goal(Pollack, 1990; Grosz and Sidner, 1990). 
In order to demonstrate the utility of the proposed communicative functions of IRUs, my plan 
is to  conduct a computational experiment. This experiment consists of simulated dialogues 
between autonomous agents with variable dialogue strategies and processing capabilities. In 
particular, the different dialogue strategies are primarily composed of varying whether agents 
produce IRUs in certain dialogue situations. The goal is to test the utility of IRUs in reducing 
the processing that agents perform in dialogue. This simulation will attempt to  validate the 
putative IRU functions of Attitude, Consequence and Attention, also described in previous 
chapters. 
Attitude (chapter 4) is what I have dubbed the communicative function achieved when agents 
infer whether a proposition representing a belief or an intention is mutually understood and 
mutually accepted. The distributional analysis of IRUs suggests that this process works over 
adjacent utterances, or over a Limited number of utterances. One proposed reason for local 
management of this process is to  ensure that agents commit to certain mutual beliefs and 
intentions, so that further reasoning is reduced(l3ratman et al., 1988). 
Consequence (chapter 5) refers to utterances in which inferences are made explicit as well as 
to utterances that license the inference of a propositional relation between two propositions. 
The inference of propositional relations, such as CONTRIBUTE, WARRANT and SUPPORT, seems 
to depend on two propositions being salient at the same time.' Thus if one proposition isn't 
salient, it may be restated t o  make it salient. An IRU can save processing for one agent in a 
dialogue, by avoiding situations in which both agents have to make the same inference by the 
' ~ h i s  is compatible with theories of how rhetorical relations are inferred, such as  RST. I t  is also compatible 
with a complexity proof by Vardi that  shows that  it  is the binary rules of inference, allowing the  combination 
of two separate facts from the database, that  increases the complexity of epistemic reasoning(Vardi, 1989). 
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RED COUCH 30 pts- BLUE COUCH 20 pts. 
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Figure 8.1: A Sample Initial State for the Design-World Task 
afraid I can't help you. Good bye. Furthermore, in the HG the corpus there is only one instance 
of any problem and only one dialogue about it. This means that it is impossible to  compare a 
case where one of the conversants produces IRUs with cases where they don't. 
I propose to conduct the simulation in the Design-World artificial domain using a variation 
of a cooperative task that has been the basis for experiments on distributed cooperative 
work(Whittaker et al., 1992). The world consists of the floor plan for a house. The task 
involves two agents with a mutual goal to  arrange a number of pieces of furniture in the rooms 
on the floor plan. Each agent has different pieces of furniture and there are more pieces avail- 
able than needed to accomplish the task. Each piece of furniture has an associated point value. 
The result of the agents engaging in a dialogue is a collaborative plan for a design layout for 
the rooms on the floor plan. The agents attempt to maximize the points achieved by the 
collaborative plan, while doing the task within the given constraints. 
Despite the disadvantages of not being a real domain, Design-World has a number of advan- 
tages. The task is inherently mixed-initiative and exhibits properties of real distributed design 
tasks(Suchman, 1985; Bly, 1988; Whittaker et al., 1992). It is simple; there is a limited amount 
of domain knowledge and only a limited number of actions to  reason about. Yet it provides a 
natural set of inferences in terms of calculations to  maximize utility and the subgoals remaining 
to complete the design for a room. Performance is easily measured by the points associated 
with the final design as compared with the costs to  achieve these points. Costs will be based 
on: (1) number of utterances in the dialogue; (2) the amount of means-end reasoning required; 
and (3)  the number of steps involved in searching the representation of current beliefs and 
intentions. This makes it possible to explore in a principled manner the trade-offs associated 
with different dialogue strategies. 
In order to  have some task structure, the basic Design-World task consists of a pair of agents 
achieving a design for a floor plan with two rooms. Furniture items are of 5 types: couch, 
table, chair, lamp and rug. Each furniture item has a color and point value. A design for a 
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room consists of any four pieces from these types. The points associated with a furniture item 
supports the calculation of utility of including that item in the design plan. This is what the 
basic performance measure is based on. Figure 8.1 shows the initial state for the dialogue. 
Each agent starts with private beliefs as t o  what pieces of furniture they have, what colors 
these pieces are and how many points they are worth. The associated domain state predicates 
are: 
(Has ?Agent ?Furniture ?Time) 
rn (Points ?Furniture ?Value) 
rn (In ?Room ?Furniture ?Time) 
rn (Design ?Room) 
In other words, what is shown in figure 8.1 as Agent A's piece, e.g. a red couch worth 30 
points, would be represented by two assertions: (Has A Red-Couch Now), (Points Red-Couch 
30). The associated domain actions are: 
rn (Put ?Agent ?Furniture ?Room ?Time) 
rn (Remove ?Agent ?Furniture ?Room ?Time) 
Some states are achievable; they can be converted to  actions by an Achieve predicate, e.g. 
(Achieve ?Agent (In Room1 Red-Couch)) and (Achieve ?Agent (Design ?Room)). Agents will 
be taken from a set of two, Ann and Bob, as well as Ann and Bob as a pair, A&B. The ?Time 
variable for each action and state is either NOW or LATER, and so is only able t o  distinguish 
future actions from current actions. 
In the Design-World simulation, the agents will share beliefs about what it means to  have a 
COLLABORATIVE P L A N  t o  achieve a mutual goal. A COLLABORATIVE PLAN is defined as: 
(COLLABORATIVE-PLAN A&B (Achieve A&B Goal)) 
rn 1. (MB A&B (Intend A&B, a; A . . .a,)) 
2. (MB A&B (Contribute ai (Achieve A&B Goal)) 
3. (MB A&B (Max-Utility a; A . . .a,) (Achieve A&B Goal)) 
A sample subgoal of the whole task would be (Design Room-1), and this would instantiate 
the definition of a collaborative plan given above with domain knowledge that  a room design 
consists of different combinations of 4 pieces of furniture. The agents have to  mutually believe 
that: (1) they intend t o  put each piece of furniture into a room; (2) these actions of putting 
furniture into a room contribute to their mutual goal; and (3)  the actions they have chosen 
have the maximum utility they are able t o  achieve given the constraints of the task, their 
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Figure 8.2: Potential Final State for Design-World Task: Represents the Collaborative Plan 
Achieved by the Dialogue 
cognitive limitations, and the externally imposed time limits on reasoning about how to do the 
task (means-end reasoning). The account of mutual beliefs was described in chapter 3. Details 
of the implementation will be given in section 8.3. 
Under the task definition, a predicate to produce subgoals, MATCHED PAIR, is defined as an 
optional component of the (Design ?Room) goal: 
If the design includes a MATCHED PAIR, then the points of each piece in the pair 
are doubled. 
A restriction on this rule is that an item may only participate in one MATCHED PAIR subgoal. 
The color predicate provides the additional parameter that supports these subgoals. Subgoals 
are necessary in order to provide some added complexity to  the discourse structure. For 
instance, a matched pair subgoal can motivate temporarily suspending a discussion about the 
design for one room, in order to  try to achieve a matched pair for the other room. This kind 
of complexity helps to  motivate the Attention type (context shifting) IRUs. In addition, this 
complexity means that the calculation of utility is not simply the addition of the values of the 
pieces involved. An individual piece may have a high value but there may be another piece 
that is worth more to the final plan because it is able to combine as a matched pair with 
a,nother piece.2 
Initially an agent has a number of pieces of furniture. A COLLABORATIVE-PLAN is achieved by 
a cycle of: (1) individual agents perform nieans-end reasoning about options in the domain; 
 his added utility from combinations may also provide an approximation of Galliers' claims that  the co- 
herence of a belief set is more than the summed coherence of the individual beliefs(Galliers, 1990; Harman, 
1986). 
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(2) individual agents deliberate about which options are preferable; (3) then agents make 
proposals to other agents, based on the options identified in a reasoning cycle, about actions 
that contribute to  the satisfaction of their goals; (4) then these proposals are accepted or 
rejected by the other agent. For instance Ann may conduct means-end reasoning for a set 
period of time, deliberate on the options produced by this reasoning, select the red couch as 
the best option to  pursue, and then propose to  Bob that they put the red couch in room-1. Bob 
considers this proposal and compares it with other options he knows of. Then Bob may accept 
the proposal, reject the proposal, or leave the proposal on the table by requesting additiona.1 
information. The communicative strategies associated with making and accepting or rejecting 
these proposals and with acquiring and providing information on which to make decisions will 
be discussed in section 8.5. Figure 8.2 shows a potential final collaborative plan for the task 
as a result of the dialogue, based on the initial state given in figure 8.1. 
Design-World is complex enough to exhibit the critical properties of the HG corpus. Dialogues 
are necessarily task-oriented, but there is no rigid task-structure since either room can be 
designed first and any design goal can be achieved before any other. This increases the vari- 
ability in the dialogues and makes them complex enough to  demonstrate the function of IRUs. 
Finally, the fact that it is a visual domain means that it is easily simulable. Even though I 
don't plan on having the agents execute the plan, I plan to display a visual representation of 
the evolving design as the dialogue  proceed^.^ 
The expectation is that there will be trade-offs between performance and the cost measures, 
such as number of utterances required to achieve a solution, according to variations in com- 
munication strategies, agent's cognitive capabilities, and uncertainty in communication. The 
expected trade-offs according to communicative strategies and other parameters will be dis- 
cussed further in section 8.5. 
8.2 IRMA architecture for Resource Bounded Reasoning 
The amgent architecture assumed here is patterned on the IRMA architecture for resource- 
bounded agents(Bratman et al., 1988; Pollack and Ringuette, 1990). This architecture forms 
the basis for the Tileworld simulation environment, and seems appropriate as a framework for 
the simulation proposed here. The basic components of the IRMA architecture are: 
Beliefs: a database of an agent's beliefs 
a Intentions: a database of an agent's intentions 
a Plan Library: what an agent knows about plans as recipes that can achieve an agent's 
goals. 
3There are a number of variations that  could be constructed in this domain if it were necessary or desirable. 
For instance, the complexity of the task is easily varied by manipulating constraints or restrictions on the 
sequencing of actions, e.g. the couch must go in the room first. Extra constraints or conflicts could be added 
by giving agents preferences for putting a particular piece of furniture in a particular room. If the simulation 
included both a planning and an execution phase, these could be  interleaved or done in two phases, and it would 
be possible to  explore which parts of the collaborative plan were determined a t  planning time and which a t  
execution time. 
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Means-end reasoner: considers how to fill in existing partial plans, proposing options that 
serve as subplans for the plans an agent has in mind. In Design-World as in Tileworld, 
the time to perform means-end reasoning will be subject to an externally imposed time 
limitation as an experimental parameter. 
Opportunity analyzer: proposes options in response to  perceived changes in the environ- 
ment. (Currently in Design-World, changes in the environment will only arise as a result 
of communication.) 
Filtering Mechanism: consists of two parts: 
- Compatibility Filter: checks options for compatibility with the agent's existing 
plans. Options deemed compatible are passed along to  the deliberation process. 
Incompatible options are passed to  the Filter override mechanism. 
- Filter override: May pass an incompatible option, along with the intention that it 
is incompatible with, to  the Deliberation process for reconsideration. Conditions on 
when an override may occur are encoded in this component. 
a Deliberation Process: decides which of a set of options to pursue. Whenever multiple op- 
tions are passed from the filtering mechanism to the deliberator they are weighed against 
each other. In Design-World, the deliberation strategy always involves a calculation of 
the point value associated with an option. 
Figure 8.3 shows the components of the IRMA architecture as they apply to  Design-World. 
In the Design-World simulation environment, I incorporate aspects of the IRMA architecture 
such as separating means-end reasoning from deliberation, and filtering new options to allow 
current intentions to play a role in reducing further deliberation. However, I wish to incorpo- 
rate concepts of limited attention which will act t o  constrain retrieval of current beliefs and 
intentions and which will interact with the means-end reasoner. 
In the Tileworld simulation using the IRMA architecture, both the agent and the environment 
were highly parameterized. The agent was parameterized with respect to the filtering and 
deliberation mechanisms that she used. The degree to which the simulation environment was 
dynamic and unpredictable was also parameterized. The Tileworld simulation explored the 
hypothesis that the effectiveness of an agent's meta-level reasoning strategy is dependent upon 
the characteristics of the environment in which the agent is situated. In Design-World, the 
environment consists of both the domain-based task and the other agent. The domain portion 
of the environment is more stable than in Tileworld, but there is uncertainty in communi- 
cation. The degree of uncertainty in communication can be parameterized in Design-World 
just as the degree of uncertainty in the domain was parameterized in Tileworld. Conimuni- 
cation also serves to increase the dynamic nature of the environment. It is impossible for an 
agent to  predict what better options another agent might have available to contribute to their 
collaborative plan. 
In the Design-World task, the potential intended acts, ie. options, are domain level intended 
acts such as putting a particular furniture piece into a particular room. These acts however 
correspond to  intended proposals in some cases, but may correspond to proposals that have 
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LIMITED ATTENTION 
MEANS-ENDS REASONER 
I 1 ACTIONS 
(mediated by dialogue strategies) 
Figure 8.3: Design-World IRMA Agent Architecture for Resource-Bounded Agents 
already been made and accepted. Because the Design-World simulation focuses on multi- 
agent communication, beliefs will be annotated as t o  whether they are thought to  be mutually 
believed and agent's intentions are annotated as t o  whether the agent believes they are mutually 
intended. The structure of these beliefs and intentions will be discussed further in sections 8.3 
and 8.4. 
The Filtering Mechanism must be carefully designed. One key aspect is that  the Compatibility 
Filter must be computationally tractable and it must not duplicate the functionality of the 
deliberation mechanism. Furthermore, in a two agent system, options that  arise due to  another 
agent's messages must a t  least be responded to, even if they do not make it to  the deliberator. 
Another key aspect is that  the Filter Override must be carefully designed so that  agents' 
existing intentions act to  constrain further reasoning and endless reconsideration of intentions, 
while a t  other times allowing intentions to be reconsidered. The Filter Override can encode 
any conditions that  are deemed desirable to  let incompatible options through. Tileworld's 
simplest Filter Override condition compares the score of a proposed option t o  that  of the 
option that  is currently being pursued. If the difference between them equals or exceeds some 
threshhold value v, then the new option passes the filter. The threshold value is set as a 
Tileworld parameter. 
The Filter Override mechanism in Design-World must treat mutual beliefs and mutual inten- 
tions differently than private ones because they play a role in the collaborative plan that  is 
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being constructed. Agents must communicate with other agents about potentional revisions 
t o  these beliefs and intentions. A mutually intended proposal must be retracted and a,gree- 
ment about the replacement proposal must be achieved, meaning that  the cost associated with 
the communication required to  establish agreement in the first place is wasted. In the first 
simulation experiments, the filter-override for both agents will be designed so that  actions 
incompatible with mutually accepted proposals never make it through the filtering mecha- 
nism. This can be implemented with a filter threshold of positive infinity for mutually agreed 
proposals. 
The next section briefly discusses the belief representation system that  will underly the repre- 
sentation of mutual beliefs. 
8.3 Belief representation system 
This account requires a belief representation system that  can keep track of beliefs and their 
underlying assumptions, as well as the endorsements on these assumptions. Galliers has de- 
veloped a theory and a system for autonomous belief revision called ABR that  has these 
properties(Galliers, 1990; Galliers, 1991b; Galliers, 1991a; Cawsey et al., 1992). The beliefs 
model developed here is a version of ABR. ABR incorporates a specialized ATMS developed 
for dialogues between autonomous agents. Each belief has an associated endorsement. I use 
the endorsement types of HYPOTHESIS, DEFAULT, ENTAILMENT, LINGUISTIC,  and ABSOLUTE 
as outlined in chapter 3. This sys te~n also implements the Principle of Positive Under~rlining 
discussed in section 4.1. 
However ABR requires a few modifications to  be used as part of the account presented here. 
First, ABR doesn't reason about mutual beliefs. Gallier's concern has been an individual 
agent's reasoning as to  whether to revise her own beliefs by either accepting or rejecting 
some incoming information. Second, in GaVier's system, agents only communicate t o  resolve 
conflicts in their own beliefs, not to  achieve mutual beliefs. Third, agents in ABR are logically 
omniscient. 
In my account, each agent has a version of mutual beliefs that  depends on what has been 
made public in the current conversation, but may include propositions licensed as inferable. 
These representations will be built on a modified version of Gallier's ABR. Each dialogue act 
and inference is tracked by ABR with respect to  its underlying assumptions. The extensions 
to  ABR explored here are limiting inference, the notion of limited attention, the exploration 
of the weakest link rule, and the incorporation of dialogue principles to  reason about mutual 
beliefs such as the collaborative principle and conversational defaults discussed in section 4.1. 
8.4 Discourse Actions 
There are three aspects of communicative actions that  must be specified: (1) the utterance 
level intentions that  an agent can achieve, (2) the propositional content of these utterance level 
intentions, and (3)  the way in which these intentions are reasoned about. I will discuss the first 
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two of these in the remainder of this section. The way in which these intentions are reasoned 
about is encapsulated in agents' communicative strategies. These strategies will be discussed 
in section 8.5. 
For the purpose of this simulation, agents communicate through an artificial language by 
sending messages to one another. I implement agents within the same process and use a 
controller to  switch control between them.4 
I use 5 utterance level intentions that may be specific to this task or this type of dialogue 
(See also (Carletta, 1992; Sidner, 1992)). These are Propose, Accept, Reject, Ask and Say. 
It would be possible in this domain to leave these intentions implicit and only communicate 
propositional content. Then hearers' would need to  infer whether an utterance counts as one of 
these actions. If this were done, additional inference procedures would be needed to  distinguish 
implicit acceptance from rejection. Since these inferences are not the focus of this thesis, I 
make these intentions explicit. Each communicative act of an agent fits the schema given 
below: 
The basic schema consists of a proposal to  do a particular action. The predicates in this domain 
are: (1) the domain action predicates of Put and Remove, which correspond to  proposals that 
the speaker is making; (2) the state predicates Points, Has, In, Design. For instance agent A 
might say: 
(Propose A B 
(Put A&B Red-Couch Room-1 Later)) 
Agent B can either accept, reject or ask for more information about this proposal. For example, 
B could reply with an acceptance in the form of a repetition: 
(Accept B A 
(Put A&B Red-Couch Room-1 Later)) 
B can also ask for more information: 
(Ask B A 
(Points Red- Couch ?)) 
As a simplifying assumption, interaction is limited such that B will always ask for more infor- 
mation if B doesn't have enough information to  make a comparison between the options that 
B knows about and the one that A has proposed. However, if B has no options available to 
satisfy the same goal, B can accept A's proposal without knowing its exact value. 
B can also reject the proposal: 
 h his is a common way of simulating individual processes and has been used in the Tileworld simulation, in 
Power's robot world and in Carletta's JAM system(Pollack and Ringuette, 1990; Power, 1974; Carletta,  1992). 
There seems to be no need for the added complexity of two separate processes. 
8.4. DISCOURSE ACTIONS 
(Reject B A 
(Put A&B Blue-Couch Room-1 Later)) 
The predicate clause in a rejection is a counter-proposal that encodes the reason that B rejects 
the proposal that A made. In this case, B believes that putting the Blue-Couch in Room-1 
is a better option. The production of a counter-proposal is a common, but not the only way 
that rejections are done in human-human dialogues. In the proposed simulation, rejections 
always include a counter-proposal. This is because, in the Design-World task, the decision to 
reject a proposal is based on comparing the proposal with other options an agent knows about. 
Another option must be of greater utility to  support a rejection, and since rejections are rarely 
IRUs, I don't intend to implement different ways of communicating a rejection. In addition, 
designing rejections t o  work in this way allows for a change of initiative with each rejection, 
which is very common in human-human problem solving dialogues(Wa1ker and Whittaker, 
1990). 
(DESIGN ROOM-1) 
CONTRIBUTES 
(PUT A&B RED-COUCH ROOM- 1 LATER) 
Figure 8.4: Partial Plan for Achieving the Design of Room 1 
The utterance intention of Say is used to communicate facts about the current state, a.nd to  
reply to questions. For instance if B asks A: 
(Ask B A 
(Points Red- Couch ?)) 
A can reply with: 
(Say A B 
(Points Red-Couch 30)) 
As messages are sent and received during a dialogue, agents construct a corresponding be- 
lieflintention structure. The propositional relations of CONTRIBUTE,  SUPPORT and WARRANT 
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(DESIGN ROOM-1) 
I CONTRIBUTES 
(PUT A&B RED-COUCH ROOM-1 LATER) 
1 WARRANTS 
(POINTS RED-COUCH 30) 
Figure 8.5: Partial Plan for Achieving the Design of Room 1 with a Warrants relation 
are the glue that holds this structure together. These can be viewed as labels connecting 
communicated propositions. The goal that a communicated proposition is related t o  can be 
inferred from the ?Room argument of a proposal. Then if the utterance intention is a proposal, 
the propositional relation is inferred to  be a CONTRIBUTE relation. For example, if A says: 
(Propose A B 
(Put  A&B Red-Couch Room-1 Later)) 
B can infer that  the proposed action CONTRIBUTES to  the (Achieve A6tB (Design Room-1)) 
goal. If B accepts this proposal, then A and B mutually believe that  the belieflintention graph 
shown in figure 8.4 is part of their collaborative plan. 
Similarly, any communicated proposition involving the Points predicate must relate that  propo- 
sition t o  a goal via the WARRANTS relation. For example, if it were mutually believed that  
(Points Red-Couch 30), then the belieflintention structure might be as depicted in figure 8.5. 
Section 5.1 discussed the fact that propositional relations in real dialogues are sometimes 
made explicit and sometimes left t o  inference. In the communicatioiz language proposed here, 
I leave them implicit. In the general case, the recognition of these relations is a plan inference 
problem and is beyond the scope of this thesis(Sidner and Israel, 1981; Sidner, 1983; Sidner, 
1985). However, the situation is restricted enough in the Design-World task that  these relations 
can generally be easily inferred. As discussed above, the goal can usually be inferred from the 
form of the proposal. The only situation in which this is not the case is when an action can 
simultaneously function to  contribute to  multiple goals. For example, if the action also could 
contribute to a matched-pair goal, and this has not been made explicit, the hearer could fail 
to  make this inference. The hearer will not however be unable t o  make sense of the proposal, 
because it is trivial to  infer one of the goals that  the proposed action contributes to. This then 
looks like a case of whether Consequence is made explicit or left t o  inference. This will be 
discussed further in section 8.5.3 and 8.5.2. 
8.5. AGENT COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 75 
* - - - - - - 
I OPEN ; 
KEY : ' - - - - - - - 
Speaker Change 
- . . . . . . Possibly NO Speaker Change 
T - -  
I ,  - ,' May be IMPLICIT 
- - - -  
ACCEPT REJECT 
- - - - PROPOSE 
SAY 
* - - - - - - - . 
I CLOSE 
I - - - - - - - - 
Figure 8.6: Dialogue Actions for the Design-World Task:Version 1 
The dialogue actions and the potential responses are shown in figure 8.6.5 The open and 
close dialogue actions shown in figure 8.6 are not always explicitly realized. They will be 
discussed in more detail in section 8.5.3. As the figure shows, proposals can be followed by 
acceptances, asks, or rejections. Rejections always include counter-proposals. In addition the 
form of proposals, and acceptances will depend on the dialogue strategies discussed throughout 
section 8.5. The potential dialogue strategies also nzust be extended to allow a proposal under 
consideration to  be suspended while another proposal is considered. This will be discussed 
further in section 8.5.3. 
8.5 Agent Communication Strategies 
An agent's communication strategy determines which discourse actions an agent has available, 
and in particular whether they produce IRUs in certain discourse situations. The hypotheses 
about the benefits of IRUs will be tested by comparing the performance of agents that sys- 
tematically produce IRUs in certain discourse situations as conipared with agents that don't. 
Since it is necessary to  separately test my hypotheses about the three separate classes of IRUs, 
there are strategies associated with each of Attitude, Consequence and Attention. However 
in order to  keep the simulation manageable, the variations in strategies must be simpler than 
those characteristic of real dialogues. Figure 8.7 depicts scl~ematically the dialogue actions that 
the strategies affect. The Attention strategies will mainly target segment openings and clos- 
ings. The Consequence strategies will mainly target the way in which Proposals are made and 
5These actions do not represent a claim that  this is how humans conceptualize dialogue or that  problem 
solving dialogues can be analyzed into structures exactly like these. These are just an approximation in order 
t o  investigate the effects of resource-bounds, which will operate independently of the range of utterance level 
intentions and other strategies available t o  an agent(Levinson, 1979; Levinson, 1981; Schegloff, 1987). 
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the Attitude strategies will affect the way acceptance is communicated. Of course as I noted 
earlier, things are not so simple in real dialogues. Both the Attitude strategies and the Con- 
sequence strategies may interact with limited attention. This interaction will be investigated 
in the simulation. 
Figure 8.7: Schema for the Primary Effect of Communicative Strategies on the Dialogue Struc- 
ture 
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Initially, two variations of explicit compared to  implicit, for each of Attitude, Consequence and 
Attention, will be explored. These variations in strategies will be discussed in detail below. 
Here I just give an overview of the full scope of the proposed experiment. The prediction is 
that these communication strategies correspond to  agents' cognitive properties and will interact 
with them. 
Each strategy will be implemented by variations in the messages that agents send one another. 
These messages will encode the communicative functions for IRUs discussed above, but will 
not vary as to  the different forms that realize these functions. This variation in form is a topic 
for future work. 
OPEN SEGMENT 
In order to  see the effect of the Attitude strategies, it is necessary to  have some variation in 
the communication environment to demonstrate the benefits of conservative communication 
strategies in uncertain environments. Uncertainty in communication will be implemented so 
that the degree of uncertainty (noise) can vary from cases where communication is certa.in to 
cases where almost every utterance has the potential for an error either in transmission or in 
interpretation. 
<---- 
PROPOSAL 
In order to  see the effect of the Consequence and Attention strategies, it is necessary to vary the 
amount of time that agents can perform means-end reasoning and to track the time required to 
search current beliefs and intentions. The number of steps involved in searching current beliefs 
is related to the Attention strategy, and the number of inference steps conducted is related to 
CONSEQUENCE STRATEGY 
f - - I  
ACCEPTlREJECT ATTITUDE STRATEGY 
CLOSE SEGMENT 
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the Consequence strategy. No matter how the current beliefs and intentions are structured, 
the hypothesis is that  an explicit Attention strategy means that  virtually no search is required, 
whereas some search will be required otherwise. 
However it is clear that  the time to  search current beliefs depends on the way they are struc- 
tured. In terms of a cognitively accurate model, this is an open research problem. The 
question is whether some approximation t o  the structure of memory can be adopted that  will 
allow a valid measurement of the effect of the Attention strategies. One potential simplify- 
ing assumption is that  current beliefs are structured in chronologically linear order based on 
recency. Search would then take place in reverse chronological order. However research on 
attention and memory in psychology indicates that  frequency also has an effect on retrieval. It 
seems that  some way of including frequency effects in the memory/attention model used here 
must be determined.6 I am currently investigating several models of attention and memory 
to  determine whether there is a simple, cognitively plausible model that  could be used in the 
simulation(Landauer, 1975; Just and Carpenter, 1992). 
The total space of the simulation is rather large, even with the limitations proposed of only two 
variations for each of the communicative functions of Attitude, Consequence and Attention. 
These combinations would give 8 different agent type combinations in terms of communicative 
strategies. Adding in two variations for noise in communication and two variations for the time 
allowed for means-ends reasoning would give 32 potential experimental set-ups. No variations 
are required for Attention since time to search current beliefs and intentions will just be tallied. 
Thus the total number of potential dialogue simulation types is 32 if: (1) the task is constant; 
(2) the information that  each agent has a t  the begining of the dialogue is constant, and (3)  if 
agents always interact with only one kind of other agent. However, I don't intend to  explore 
the whole space. I will focus on certain points in the space that  I expect t o  produce interesting 
interactions, e.g. the interaction between an agent that  has an explicit Consequence strategy 
and one that  is a limited reasoner. Additional runs can be done if there is time to  do a 
fuller interactional analysis. For instance, it would be of interest t o  change the information 
distribution and see how the dialogue varies. 
A question that  comes up repeatedly in analyzing dialogue and in producing this kind of 
simulation is the difference between a strategy that  makes it possible for an agent to  do 
something as compared with one that makes it easier for an agent t o  do something. It is often 
impossible to  distinguish these two ca,ses from observations of the behavior of human a,gents. 
For instance when analyzing the utterances in a dialogue, we cannot distinguish eliminating 
ambiguity from reducing the amount of search or inference required to  unambiguously interpret 
an  utterance. However in the simulation environment we can state whether in principle it is 
possible for an agent t o  interpret an utterance and compare this possibility with the amount 
of time that  it takes t o  make the interpretation. 
The communicative strategies associated with each of the three IRU classes will be discussed 
below. Section 8.5.1 will describe the proposed Attitude strategies, section 8.5.2 will describe 
6 A  complication with a representation that  includes only recency and frequency for directly realized proposi- 
tions is that  it  is possible that  retrieval of one belief would bring along and 'refresh' other beliefs and intentions 
that  are associatively linked by propositional relations such as WARRANTS. This may be a version of a focus 
space; the mention of something introduced in a particular context evokes the whole context and not just the 
item mentioned(Grosz, 1977; Sidner, 1979). 
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the proposed Consequence strategies and section 8.5.3 will describe the proposed Attention 
strategies. 
8.5.1 Attitude Strategies 
Earlier I discussed 5 different dialogue actions that directly address the assumptions underlying 
mutual understanding (Clark and Schaefer, 1989), and which also can lead to  an inference of 
acceptance by the application of the COLLABORATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
prompt such as uh huh 
repetition 
paraphrase 
making an inference explicit 
implicit acceptance, going on with next part of the plan 
In order t o  investigate some of the trade-offs with these different ways of indicating acceptance, 
it is necessary to  contrast implicit acceptance with one of the attitude-explicit dialogue actions. 
The choice of which attitude-explicit action to  implement interacts with the choice about how 
to make communication less than certain. If communication is uncertain due to referential 
a,mbiguity, then pa,raphrase is a good strategy. If it is desirable to model something similar 
to the noise in communication in a speech recognition system, then repetition is a reasonable 
attitude-explicit action. I don't consider using prompts because they only demonstrate at- 
tention, and any relevant utterance can demonstrate attention. I don't consider the strategy 
of making an inference explicit because it interacts with Consequence. Because paraphrase 
requires a source of principled ambiguity, I will implement REPETITION as the attitude-explicit 
action. 
Thus there will be two agent strategies associated with A t t i t ~ d e . ~  The two attitude strategies 
are: (1) I M P L I C I T  ACCEPTANCE: the agent indicates acceptance by going ahead to the next 
part of the dialogue, either by closing the current segment of dialogue or by making a new 
proposal; (2) the agent indicates acceptance with a REPETITION of the proposal that the other 
agent made. 
As mentioned above, the REPETITION explicit Attitude strategy interacts with a specific kind 
of noise in the communication environment. Noise in the transmission and interpretation of 
a message will be simulated with a noise-maker which will randomly pick an argument of a 
communicated predicate and replace it with another value of the same type. For example, a 
proposal to  put the red chair into room-1, could be changed into a proposal to put the blue 
chair into room-1, to  put the red couch into room-1, or to  put the red-chair into room-2. This 
Ineans that the errors will produce messa.ges that are interpretable in the domain. A problem 
with this kind of error is that it may cause some bias toward the explicit Attitude strategy 
7For simplicity, agents in the simulation always reject a proposal in the same way, so rejection introduces no 
variation. 
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because it will increase the likelihood of that the error is not discovered immediately. This 
may not be a very good approximation of the type of errors that one might actually expect, 
but the effect of the error and the recovery from the error should approximate real dialogue 
situations closely enough to  test the hypothesized attitude function. 
The prediction is that in noisy communication environments, the explicit attitude strategy 
embodied by repetition will be more efficient since it avoids potential invalid plans, or at the 
least costly misunderstandings and replanning. In order to  demonstrate this properly, it is 
necessary to  have a reasonable recovery mode for errors that arise from using the higher-risk 
strategy of implicit acceptance(Carletta, 1992). 
The beliefs model proposed in chapter 3 supports recovery strategies based on examining 
assumptions that are weakly endorsed and therefore easily defeasible. In the case of this sim- 
ulation, the choice of recovery strategy is determined by the attitude communication strakegy. 
There is only one way in which the communication can fail, so recovery can co~lsist of simply 
repeating the misunderstood utterance or the part that was misunderstood. In other words, 
recovery consists of addressing the weakly endorsed COMPLETE H E A R I N G  assumption. 
An independent question is what happens if the misunderstanding is discovered much later in 
the dialogue? What happens to  the intervening partial plans that have been agreed on? In 
human-human dialogues, this kind of misunderstanding often results in agents starting again 
from the beginning. As I pointed out in chapter 4, the Principle of Positive Undermining 
predicts that each inference made from a false belief must be explicitly retracted in order to 
ensure that it is gone(Harman, 1986; Galliers, 1990). For the time being, I will not require 
explicit retraction, but will dispose of dependent beliefs as tracked by the TMS implementing 
the beliefs model. 
However, all the previous discussion about recovery strategies assumes that errors will in fact 
be detected, but this is not necessarily the case. In the case of an explicit attitude strategy, 
errors will always be detected immediately. In the case of an implicit attitude strategy, errors 
may be detected much later, or not at all. They can be detected later if the fact communicated 
in error is made explicit later in the dialogue via an explicit consequence strategy or attention 
strategy. If they are not detected at all the collaborative plan will be invalid. 
8.5.1.1 Prediction 
The prediction is that an agent embodying the explicit Attitude strategy will achieve higher 
task scores than an agent embodying the implicit Attitude strategy in communication situ- 
ations that are noisy. The number of utterances produced will be tracked as a cost as well 
as the costs to  retrieve current beliefs and intentions. I would expect that implicit Attitude 
strategies could result in longer dialogues in noisy situations because some of the dialogue is 
wasted correcting a misunderstanding that could have been corrected earlier. Alternately an 
implicit Attitude strategy may result in invalid collaborative plans which could either have a 
score of 0, or have the total score reduced by eliminating the invalid proposal. 
Another prediction is that an explicit Attitude strategy may interact with the attention/working 
memory model since it increases the frequency of a proposition in memory. A proposition that 
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is repeated may be faster to retrieve. If a repeated proposition is used later on in the dialogue, 
the explicit Attitude strategy might result in faster retrieval times, and lower costs. 
8.5.2 Consequence Strategies 
As noted in section 8.4 the propositional relations of CONTRIBUTE, SUPPORT and W A R R A N T  
will always be left implicit and will be inferred by the hearer. I claimed in chapter 5 that one 
function of IRUs is to make it easier to make these types of inferences.' This seems to  be 
the case most often in the HG corpus when the IRU provides a WARRANT for the course of 
action under discussion(Cohen, 1987).~ Therefore the Consequence strategies are independent 
of these inferences which will always be left to  the hearer to  make. 
There will be two Consequence strategies, an explicit Consequence strategy and an implicit 
Consequence strategy. In the implicit Consequence strategy, agents will not make inferences 
explicit such as the mathematical calculation to determine the utility of the current proposal. 
They also won't restate propositions that don't involve calculations, but that are meant to be 
inferred as a WARRANT for a proposal under discussion. In the explicit Consequence strategy, 
they will. In other words a proposal under the implicit consequence strategy will be: 
(Propose A B 
(Put A&B Red-Couch Room-1 Later)) 
A proposal under the explicit Consequence strategy includes information that is mean to serve 
as a WARRANT. This information is stated whether or not it is already mutually believed. For 
example the Points information in the proposal below: 
(Propose A B 
(Put A&B Red-Couch Room-1 Later)) 
(Say A B 
(Points Red-Couch 30)) 
The Consequence strategies are predicted to  interact with a resource-bound on agents' infer- 
ence/reasoning capabilities. The limit that will be explored in the simulation is to  limit agents' 
means-end reasoning. This is a reasonable place to  put a limitation since means-end reasoning 
produces options that correspond to  potential proposals. The structure of the domain means 
that some proposaa can be made even with means-end reasoning severely limited. An agent 
only has t o  be able to access one predicate describing one of their current pieces in order to 
be able to make a proposal.10 
'See example 36. 
'1 also suggested an additional function of IRUs as  a WARRANT; it is not necessary to  reason about whether 
t o  accept a WARRANT that  is already mutually believed. 
''TO realize the  goals of the  simulation, it would not make sense to  put limitations on agents' utterance 
producing capability since this would require a theory of suboptimal utterance production and could potentially 
involve the design of a number of strategies for recovery from suboptimal utterances. Limits on the amount of 
time spent deliberating will automatically follow from limits on means-end reasoning since fewer options will be 
passed to the  deliberation component. 
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Section 8.5.3 discussed the fact that  there is an interaction between Consequence and Attention. 
One case of this interaction will affect the simulation with respect t o  inferences about the 
achievement of MATCHED-PAIR goals. In the Design-World task the subgoal of a MATCHED- 
PAIR can be simultaneously satisfied by an action that contributes t o  a (Design ?Room) goal. 
Thus it is possible that  an agent would only infer the (Design ?Room) goal and not the 
MATCHED-PAIR goal. However, an explicit segment opening statement can function to  obviate 
the need to  make an inference that  the current proposal can contribute to  a MATCHED-PAIR 
subgoal. 
8.5.2.1 Prediction 
An agent embodying the explicit Consequence strategy will achieve better scores than an agent 
embodying the implicit Consequence strategy when interacting with an agent that  is limited 
as time allowed for the performance of means-end reasoning. 
8.5.3 Attention Strategies 
There will be two Attention strategies. However, since any IRU, and indeed any utterance, 
manipulates attentional state when it is said, there is an overlap between Attention and the 
other two communicative functions. Because of this, the Attention strategies will be as inde- 
pendent as possible of Attitude and Consequence. The explicit Attention strategy IRUs will 
consist of statements to  open and close discourse segments. 
The concept of Attention in this account draws on Grosz and Sidner's notion of focus spaces(Grosz, 
1977; Sidner, 1979; Grosz and Sidner, 1985). According t o  their theory, each discourse segment 
has a corresponding focus space containing the relations, propositions and discourse entities 
evoked in that  segment. Since this is a fairly simple task, discourse segments will arise natu- 
rally from the task structure, with a segment corresponding to  each subgoal of the ta,sk and 
the structure of the task driving the structure of the discourse(Hobbs and Evans, 1979; Power, 
1974). Each segment consists of a number of propositions including (1) the current goal; (2) 
the current proposal; and (3) other related propositions evoked during the dialogue correspond- 
ing t o  the current segment. Propositions will be linked by one of the propositional relations 
discussed earlier in 5.1. The examples given below will provide motivation for a discussion as 
to whether the concept of a focus space requires a stack mechanism. 
The hypothesis is that  the IRU in 47-(17) functions to  close the segment starting with the 
question given in 47-(6). 
(47) ( 6) r. ................ or uh does that income from the certificate of deposit rule her out 
as a dependent 
( 7 )  h. yes it does 
( 8) r. it does 
( 9 )  h. yup, that knocks her out. 
now there is something you can do. do you support her in any way? 
(10) r. yes i mean she yeah we supply everything, heat, light, food, in other words we 
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you know she pays nothing as far as the uh upkeep of the home 
(11) h. the only amount you have spent then is indirect. 
r. uh 
h. there's nothing direct 
r. yea 
h. then that you spend 
(12) r. food 
(13) h. the rest of her support comes out of her three thousand and social security 
(14) r. yeah whatever clothes she needs er or uh dental care, that kind of thing 
(15) h. well the medical and dental care you can deduct provided you can establish 
that you have provided more than half support. 
(16) r. uh huh 
(17) h. BUT THE DEPENDENCY YOU CANNOT CLAIM 
(18) r. um hm (breath) I see. 
ok. uhh, alright, the second question ... 
The fact that 47-(17) occurs is an argument for the existence of some kind of stack mechanism 
associated with discourse segments. The intervening discussion from (9) to (16) seems to 
be carried out with an understanding that the question given in (6) is still pending in some 
sense. In the focus space model this would mean that (9) to (16) is an embedded segment. 
Utterance 47-(17) indicates that that embedded segment is closed as well as its parent segment 
corresponding to the dialogue up to  (9). 
Discourses can be opened with IRUs that set the context for what the discourse will be about. 
For example, if one American said to another on November 10th that Thanksgiving is coming 
up,  that utterance could hardly be said to be informative by itself. It would probably serve to  
set the context however, and to simplify the process of making sense of a following utterance 
such as Have you bought a turkey?. In the HG corpus, I didn't count beliefs that were common 
cultural knowledge as mutual beliefs, in order to  ensure that the IRUs that this analysis is based 
on really consist of information that should have been mutually believed, and in order to make 
my criteria for selecting IRUs replicable. The only examples of segment opening statements 
that could possibly be counted as IRUs under my criteria would be those whose propositional 
material had already been discussed in the same dialogue. Therefore the examples given below 
consist of 'reopening' a discourse segment. 
These discourse segment reopenings often have the sense of 'picking up where you left off'. 
A segment may have been left suspended for a number of reasons such as an interruption by 
another speaker or a need to temporarily turn to another topic. Consider the utterance in 
48-(23). 
(48) (13) e. Well however this is my question: I am a single woman, and retired. I have 
about 120 M, and I'll tell you how it's broken down and perhaps you can advise me 
(14) h. How old are you elsa? 
(15) e. I am seven six, alright? 
(16) h. I got you 
(17) e. uh 70,000 i n  CDs, 30,000 - 
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(18) h. When are they due? 
(19) e. Pardon? 
(20) h. When are they due? 
(21) e. Well they're due right now, every month one is due until June 
(22) h.  They're due one a month? 
(23) e. Yes sir. NOW THAT'S 70. 
Now another 30 in low-income CDs a t  8% - the long term ones, you know? 
(24) h. When are they due? ........ 
After an interruption by Harry, starting a t  (18), Elsa (e), in (23)) tries t o  continue her enu- 
meration of how her money is invested. When she starts this, she first produces a summary of 
the extent of her investments she had accounted for so far a t  the time of the interruption. The 
IRU marks the re-opening of the previous segment. It would have been possible for this IRU 
to simultaneously involve Consequence as well as Attention. For instance if the interruption 
from Harry had come after Elsa (e) had described how she had an additional 30 thousand of 
her money invested, Elsa might have said Now that's 100 instead of Now that's 70. In either 
case it would have marked a return to  the previous segment. But in the former case it would 
have also made an inference explicit. 
Another way in which Attention interacts with Consequence is that  an IRU that  closes a seg- 
ment might make an inference explicit, rather than just repeating or paraphrasing information. 
Consider utterance (26) in the excerpt from example 45 repeated here for convenience: 
(49) (20) h. right. The maximum amount of credit that you will be able to  get will be 400 
that  T H E Y  will be able to get will be 400 dollars on  their tax return 
(21) c. Four hundred dollars for the whole year? 
(22) h. Yeah it'll be 20% 
(23) c. um hm 
(24) h. Now if indeed they pay the two thousand dollars to  your wife, that's great. 
(25) c. um hm 
(26) h.  SO W E  HAVE FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS. Now as far as you are con- 
cerned that  could cost you more. Remember, you're gonna have 2000 worth of income. 
What's your tax bracket? ..... 
It would be possible t o  have an agent that  was both attention-explicit and also consequence- 
explicit produce IRUs like this rather than the simple closing messages discussed below. The 
simulation will explore this interaction between Attention and Consequence. 
The basic component of the explicit Attention strategy consists of statements that  indicate 
the opening and closing of a discourse segment. The implicit Attention strategy, as a control, 
will not include these opening and closing statements. Opening and closing statements for the 
simulation are given below: 
(Say A B 
(Open (Achieve A&B (Design Room-1)))) 
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(Say A B 
(Close (Achieve A&B (Design Room-1)))) 
These messages are a poor match for the diversity of surface forms that  opening and closing 
statements have in naturally occurring dialogues, but the interpretation of language forms is 
not the topic of this dissertation and so much of this diversity will have to  remain a topic 
for future work. However, once the first round of simulations are done, testing some of the 
basic predictions, it may be possible t o  test Attention strategies that  directly interact with 
Consequence. Example in Design-World would be a closing statement such as That gets us 
120 points so far or a (re)-opening statement such as We agreed on putting the red-chair and 
red-couch i n  room-1, when returning t o  a goal such as the (Design Room-1). 
Opening and closing statements are equivalent t o  Carletta's low-risk context articulation strat- 
egy(Carletta, 1992). Carletta states that  this strategy in actuality has no effect on agents' 
knowledge because the statements about the task itself always make the goal explicit. This 
is generally the case here as well. For example a proposal to  (Put  A&B Red-Couch Room-1 
Later) can be easily inferred to  be an action that  CONTRIBUTES t o  the goal (Achieve A&B 
(Design Room-1)). There is no need to have this goal made explicit beforehand. Thus these 
opening statements are essentially IRUs that make these inferences explicit.'l Even though 
agents can make these inferences, it may be that  in this simulation environment, unlike Car- 
letta's, the difference between Attention Strategies will interact with resource-bounds and the 
calc~ilation of costs associated with completing the task. 
Furthermore, there seems t o  be more going on in the naturally occurring dialogues than just 
indicating the opening of a segment or marking the reopening of a previous segment. An 
excellent example is provided by the following dialogue excerpt, repeated here from chapter 6: 
(50) ( 3 ) e  ...... 
- and i was wondering - should i continue on with the certificates or 
( 4) h. well it's difficult to tell because we're so far away from any of them - but i 
would suggest this - if all of these are 6 month certificates and i presume they are 
( 5 )  e. yes 
( 6) h. then i would like to see you start spreading some of that money around 
( 7 )  e. uh hu 
( 8) h. now in addition, how old are you 
(discussion and advice about starting an  IRA) 
(21) e. uh huh and 
(22) h. but as far as the certificates are concerned, I'D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT 
A LITTLE BIT - THEY'RE ALL 6 MONTH CERTIFICATES 
(23) e. yes 
(24) h. and i don't like putting all my eggs in one basket - and i would suspect that  
''In the  distribution analysis of the HG corpus, I wouldn't count utterances tha t  s ta te  the goal as IRUs since 
it wouldn't be clear that  they would have been in that  situation. 
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february 25 would be a good time t o  put it into something that runs for 2 and a half 
years. that  first one that  comes due. call me on the others as they come due ...... 
I would particularly like t o  focus on 50-(22). I repeat (22) here labelling the clauses under 
discussion: 
(51)22a.but as far as the certificates are concerned, 
22b. I'D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT - 
22c. THEY'RE ALL 6 MONTH CERTIFICATES 
It cannot be the case that  the only purpose of the IRUs in 51-22b and 51-22c is to  evoke a 
previous context; 51-22a alone should be adequate t o  mark a return t o  a previous segment in 
which certificates were being discussed. Yet, if the focus space representation of that previous 
segment includes all the propositions and discourse entities that  were part of it(Grosz, 1977; 
Sidner, 1979), how could these IRUs possibly have a function? If we assume that  the speaker 
here is rational, it would seem that  they must have an additional function related to a return to 
a previous segment. One explanation would be that  not all of the previously discussed items are 
currently relevant, and the function of the IRU is to  select as the locus of attention some limited 
subset of the items in the previous segment. Another explanation would be that  by default 
none of the items in the previous segment are salient and they must be re-evoked. However, 
Grosz's naturally occurring examples of a felicitous reference to  the pump as it, after the pump 
hadn't been mentioned for a long period of time would seem to  contradict this. I t  is possible 
that  another explanation for that  could be found. For instance, it might be worth considering 
the possibility that  the pump in that situation was SITUATIONALLY E v o ~ E ~ ( P r i n c e ,  1981b). 
Under either of these hypotheses, the open question is exactly how a speaker (and in this case 
a Design-World artificial agent), decides which items in the focus space of a previous segment 
should be restated in some form in the current segment. There are two separate issues here: (1) 
whether or not any previous material is restated, and (2) what previous material is restated. 
I will refer t o  (1) as the REINVOCATION problem and (2) as the SELECTION problem. These 
are distinct problems. The Attention strategy distinguishes between agents who do or do not 
reinvoke previous material. This leaves aside the selection problem. Different algorithms could 
be involved in selection. For instance, all the items in a previous segment could be selected, or 
items could be selected with a simple strategy such as most recently used. Another selection 
strategy would be select only certain types of items from the previous segment that  are the basis 
of lots of inferences such as Points propositions. I will start with a simple selection strategy of 
randomly selecting a proposition t o  repeat, and hope t o  refine this as the simulation progresses. 
Although there is evidence that attention/working memory capacity is limited in human 
agents(Miller, 1956), I will not actually place a limit on agents' attentional capacity. I ex- 
pect that  these limitations will show up in the time t o  retrieve a belief that  will follow from 
the attention/memory model incorporated into the simulation. This model must incorporate 
both frequency and recency effects for beliefs discussed during a dialogue(Landauer, 1975). 
The time or number of steps required to  retrieve beliefs will be kept track of as a cost in 
performing the task. 
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8.5.3.1 Predict ion 
The prediction is that an agent embodying an explicit Attention strategy will achieve higher 
task scores than an agent embodying an implicit Attention strategy, when the cost of retrieving 
prior beliefs and intentions is deducted from the score achieved. 
Another prediction is that the explicit Attention strategy may interact with agents that are 
limited ~neans-end reasoners by reducing the amount of inference necessary to infer a matched- 
pair goal. 
8.5.4 Summary 
This section has discussed the communicative strategies that will be used in the simulation. 
Initial tests of the hypotheses will be carried out using two strategies for each of Attitude, 
Consequence and Attention. These strategies will allow comparisons between explicit and 
implicit realization of each of the putative IRU communicative functions. 
The strategies will interact with communication channel and amgent properties of noise, limited 
inference and attention. While the potential space for the simulation is quite large, I will only 
explore certain points in the space where I would expect particular interactions to occur. 
The model of limited attention needs to be refined since it will be a major determinant of the 
way the simulation works. Limited attention may interact with limited inference and in fact 
could be the cause of agents' limited inferential capabilities. 
8.6 Comparison with Other Work 
While there is certainly a great deal of previous research in linguistics, philosophy, psychology 
and computational linguistics that is related to this work, this review focuses on computational 
models of dialogue or multi-agent communication that are especially relevant to the approach 
taken here. 
The approach adopted in this thesis originates with the work of Power (Power, 1974; Power, 
1984). Power was the first person to test a theory of dialogue through an experimental system 
with two artificial agents who collaborated to achieve their goals. Power's system was mixed 
initiative, and control was alternated between agents. My work differs from Power's in focus- 
ing on a particular class of dialogue phenomena and in trying to demonstrate the utility of 
particular dialogue strategies as compared to others. 
The most recent work in the same vein as Power is that of Carletta(Carletta, 1992). Carletta 
explores different styles of communication in the context of a Map-Task Dialogue, where the 
goal of the task is for the planning agent, the instructor, to instruct the reactive agent, the 
instructee, how to get from one place to another on the map. The instructor has a map 
with a number of landmarks and a route on it. The instructee's map's landmarks may not 
exactly match. The instructee must draw the route on their version of the map. Carletta's 
simulated dialogues are single initiative, which follows directly from the type of task that is 
8.6. COMPARISON W I T H  OTHER lVORI< 87 
being modeled. The instructor embodies a number of different kinds of strategies for how to 
accomplish the goal of getting the instructee to  draw a route on a map. 
Carletta's work explores many issues that are relevant for this thesis, including 'high risk' 
dialogue strategies, and methods of recovering from these strategies when failure occurs. Agents 
can take risks with respect to whether or not they make the context explicit, what Carletta 
calls 'context articulation'. This is similar to the explicit Attention strategy discussed above. 
However Carletta notes that, in the Map task, context articulation doesn't serve any function 
because the context is always obvious. A more critical 'high risk' strategy involves definite 
references to  locations that may not appear on the instructee's map, e.g. the big river. The 
'low risk' version of achieving the same goal might involve asking the instructee whether or not 
they have a big river on their map, before producing an instruction that refers to  it. High risk 
strategies produce failures in communication that must be recovered from. The only actions 
that the instructee can initiate are clarifications to address referential failures produced by high 
risk strategies. The instructor then initiates one of several recovery strategies, using a notion 
of utility to  select between them. The recovery strategy selected is based on calculations of 
the expected cost of repairing the current plan or replanning from scratch. 
Carletta argues that 'high risk' strategies are more efficient, but there are problems with 
evaluating the various strategies in the Map Task. This is because it is difficult to define a 
performance measure for the Map Task, and the subjects who carried out the task were not 
told that their performance would be measured by any particular criteria. The only measure 
of efficiency possible is the length of the dialogue, but this ignores the quality of the solution, 
and indeed some of the subject pairs produced routes that barely approximated the one they 
were supposed to  draw. This means that the Map Task dialogue corpus cannot be used to 
explore the efficiency trade-offs of different dialogue strategies. 
My work differs from Carletta's in focusing on mixed-initiative dialogues, and using a task in 
which both agents propose and accept plans. In addition, the fact that the value of an accepted 
plan is easily calculable means that I have an objective measure of the success or failure of 
various strategies. In both the human-human dialogues that I intend to  collect and in the 
artificial agent dialogues, there is a clear notion of maximizing utility of the collaborative plan. 
The notion of a collaborative plan is very close to  that of Grosz and Sidner's (G&S) Shared- 
Plan(Grosz and Sidner, 1990). However, because there are some contrasts, I have proposed 
my own definitions for the sake of simplicity. I use a simpler plan representation than the 
one that they have proposed because my focus is on the dialogue behavior that produces the 
plan, rather than the plan itself. I assume that the execution of all actions is intended by both 
agents. This simplification is possible because the proposed actions are not actually executed 
by robots. If they were to be executed, then which agent is to do what when would also have 
to  be discussed. Presumably, if one a,gent were capable of putting a piece of furniture in a 
room, there would be no need for two agents to  synchronize on this activity. I also incorporate 
a utility measure as part of the definition of a collaborative plan, and assume a global utility 
function defined by the Design-World task. 
Another difference between the two accounts is in the treatment of coming to  an agreement 
to carry out a proposed action. According to G&S's Conversational Default Rule(CDR2), the 
non-initiating agent will adopt the initiating agent's goals as a default: 
88 C H A P T E R  8. COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATION 
SharedPlan* (Gl ,G2 Achieve P ) )  & Desire (GI ,  Do (G2, action)) 
& Believe (G2, Exec (G2, Action)) & Believe (G2, Contribute (Action, (Achieve 
PI>> 
+ Intend (G2, Action) 
This default rule licenses the inference of mutual beliefs based on the previous mental state 
of the hearer, but not on any evidence the hearer provides(cf. (Perrault, 1990)). The only 
exception t o  this is in the first utterance of the dialogue where the non-initiating agent agrees 
to  construct a SharedPlan. Once the non-initiator has agreed t o  construct a SharedPlan, it 
seems that  she has also agreed to  follow the strategy that  the initiator of the SharedPlan 
proposes. In contrast, in the dialogue situation that  I explore here, the conversants start out 
with a mutual goal t o  achieve a design for the floor plan, but cannot be sure that  the other 
conversant will either understand or agree with everything they propose. 
Another difference is that  because G&S are modeling collaboration in the domain, they have 
no need t o  model understanding. One consequence of this is that  utterances such as 0.K. add 
beliefs about executability directly. In my account, an utterance such as this contributes t o  the 
endorsement on the attention assumption that  underlies the mutual belief about understand- 
ing. The belief about executability follows as an inference from the collaborative principle. 
Recent work in progress by Sidner develops the SharedPlan account with a negotiation lan- 
guage(Sidner, 1992). Sidner's recent work hasn't yet addressed issues of resource-bounds and 
efficient strategies. In addition, this approach doesn't make clear under what circumstances 
agents make, accept and reject proposals, or when they ask for or provide additional informa- 
tion t o  support decisions. 
This work is also related to  research by Galliers (Galliers, 1989; Galliers, 1991b; Galliers, 
1991a). In Galliers' theory of communication, conflict is a beneficial and necessary compo- 
nent of cooperation. Galtiers theory includes a model of belief revision, ABR, that  supports 
agents' decisions about whether and how they wish t o  revise their beliefs in the light of new 
incoming information. ABR is the account of belief that  I assume here and is the basis for 
the account of mutual beliefs that  I have developed as well. Recently this group has been 
carrying out a number of empirical evaluations of their framework. Their focus has been on 
architectural variations that  affect how many inter-agent conflicts are resolved in the course of 
the dia,logue(Cawsey et a,l., 1992). My focus on resource-bounds and associated communicative 
strategies distinguishes my work from theirs. 
This work also is related to  that  of Litman(Litman and Allen, 1990), who relates discourse 
intentions t o  task plans. My treatment of discourse plans is not as sophisticated as Litman's. 
I simplify the simulation here by using schemas in which achieving mutual belief is part of 
the domain defined task. The need to  achieve mutual belief is what motivates communication 
and agents in this sin~ulation communicate in fairly stereotypical patterns. Another difference 
between this work and theirs is captured by Litman and Allen's INFORM AXIOM: 
Header: Inform (S, H, P )  
Prerequ: Know (S, P) 
Decomp: Surface-Inform (S,H,P) 
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Effects: Know (H,  P) ,  KNOW (H, KNOW (S, P))  
This stipulates that after an inform action the hearer knows the proposition that the speaker 
intended to  convey. My work extends this approach by considering cases where this process can 
go awry, for instance cases where the hearer does not understand what the speaker intended to 
convey, or cases where the hearer does not wish to adopt a proposal put forth by the speaker. 
Another point of divergence with the accounts of Litman, Allen, Cohen and Perrault is in 
the existence of IRUs themselves. Their speech-act based accounts of plan recognition and 
generation would have to  be extended in some way to  account for the presence of IRUs. 
Perrault has proposed that the recognition of redundancy actually triggers the inference of 
an indirect speech act, but many of the IRUs presented here can be understood as I N F O R M S  
despite the fact that the information they convey is already in the representation of mutual 
beliefs. Cohen's speech act generation axioms rule out the generation of I N F O R M  utterances 
whose propositional content has already been conveyed, however IRUs could be produced if 
a new speech act was introduced. Litman and Allen's plan inference heuristics disprefers the 
recognition of a plan whose effect has already been achieved. This means that IRUs would not 
be recognized as I N F O R M  speech acts, and again either the definition of an I N F O R M  would have 
to be changed or a new speech act would have to be introduced. 
Figure 8.6 summarizes the discussion above on the relationship of this work to  other com- 
putational models with respect to certain agent /dialogue properties. The contributions of 
this thesis are in exploring the relationship between agents' cognitive properties and certain 
types of dialogue behavior. I focus on mixed-initiative problem-solving dialogues, between 
resource-bounded autonomous agents. 
Figure 8.8: Agent Properties in Other Work 
KEY 
GS90: (Grosz and Sidner, 1990) 
P74: (Power, 1974) 
C92: (Carletta, 1992) 
LA90: (Litman and Allen, 1990) 
G89: (Galliers, 1989; Galliers, 1991b; Galliers, 1991a) 
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The dialogue model presented here assumes that agents are autonomous. Previous work has 
often assumed that agents are cooperative and helpful and will adopt the goals and beliefs of 
others(but see (Galliers, 1989)). I have dropped this simplifying assumption in order to  moti- 
vate utterances in which agents explicitly indicate acceptance. I have introduced parameters 
into the simulation model in order to  be specific about when agents will adopt the goals and 
beliefs of others and when they won't, in order to  explore the trade-offs of different strategies 
when agents are autonomous. 
Both of the a,gents engaged in the dialogue model presented here have their own goals, prefer- 
ences and beliefs. Dialogues are simpler when one agent's beliefs are a subset of the other's(Rosenschein, 
1985)) and sometimes previous researchers have made this simplification. 
The agents in the simulation produce IRUs in particular situations. A dialogue strategy that 
includes IRUs would appear to  be a patently inefficient strategy. One goal of the simulation 
is to see whether IRUs can actually reduce processing in different discourse situations. This 
focus on resource-bounds distinguishes this work from previous accounts of dialogue. 
Agents' Attitude strategies are hypothesized to relate to the capability for misunderstanding. 
Some previous research has focused on how agents recover from misunderstanding, but no- 
one to  my knowledge has attempted to demonstrate the computational efficiency of strategies 
which avoid misunderstanding in the first place. 
8.7 Summary 
This proposal has presented a class of INFORMATIONALLY R E D U N D A N T  utterances that violate 
in one respect or another previous accounts of dialogue. I have classified these IRUs according 
to  three communicative functions: Attitude, Consequence and Attention. I have argued that 
these utterances reflect the fact that human agents are resource-bounded in particular ways. 
I haven't argued that IRUs are the only way that these functions can be achieved, only that 
they seem to be a natural way to achieve these functions in the circumstances in which they 
occur. In addition, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the primary speaker intention in 
producing an utterance is related to  only one of the above functions. Individual utterances 
often seem to function at more than one level, since for instance, every utterance manipulates 
the attention of the discourse participants. 
Of course other accounts of the phenomena discussed here are possible, and there are sure to 
be ways of dealing with the utterances discussed here within other theories of dialogue. 
I have conducted the initial phases of a distributional analysis over a large corpus of naturally 
occurring advisory dialogues in an attempt to validate some of my claims. I also argue that 
my claims about processing are difficult to validate with a corpus analysis and have proposed a 
computational experiment that should provide further support for my claims. This experiment 
should also help to tease apart the relationship between an agent's intentions and the surface 
form of the utterances that they produce. 
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